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content analysis system for measuring positive concessions (offering concessions) and negativeA   
concessions (rejecting offered concessions) was introduced and validated through an archival study of  
government-to-government documents from  crises,  of which escalated to war and  of which weret  4  2   2   
peacefully resolved. In the archival documents, concession making was positively associated withl  .  
affiliation motivation and negatively associated with power motivation.  2nd, laboratory experimental  A  
study confirmed these relationships and demonstrated priming effects of motive imagery and concessiont  i  t  l ti i   t t  i i  t   ti  i   i  
in  received diplomatic letter, on participants' responses. Finally, the motive imagery andmaking,i , i  a i  i l ti  l tt ,  ti i t ' . i ll , t  ti  i   
concessions scores in participants' responses were related in predicted ways to their policy choices.i  s r s i  rti i t ' r  r  r l t  i  r i t  s t  t ir li  i s. 
Not every conflict or crisis escalates to war. Even when there 
may seem to be no way out, a way is sometimes found. For 
example, at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 
1962, U.S. President John F. Kennedy estimated the chances of 
nuclear war as "somewhere between one out of three and even" 
(Sorenson, 1965, p. 705). Yet Soviet President Nikita Khrushchev 
and Kennedy worked their way out of a nuclear box, each making 
concessions while resisting the siren calls from some advisors to 
"stand firm" or even begin military action (Fursenko & Naftali, 
1997). 
In March of that same year, French President Charles de Gaulle, 
who had been brought to power in 1958 by a virtual military coup 
in support of a continued colonialist "Algerie franchise," success­
fully negotiated Algerian independence. And 6 months later, on a 
visit to France's ancient enemy Germany, de Gaulle several times 
spoke, in German, of "the great German people," repeatedly ex­
claiming, with his arms raised above his head, "Es lebe Deut­
schland!" ["Long live Germany!"] (de Gaulle, 1970, pp. 6-9, 15; 
see also La Couture, 1991, p. 341). 
Finally, consider the annus mirabilis that began in February 
1989. On the 6th of that month, the government of Poland re­
frained from introducing martial law to suppress dissent (as it had 
in December 1981) and instead began roundtable talks that led to 
open elections. In October, the East German regime responded to 
massive demonstrations in East Berlin and Dresden, not with force 
and repression (as in 1953), but with discussions that began the 
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process of peaceful unification of East and West Germany. In 
November, the "velvet revolution" in Czechslovakia led to the end 
of one-party rule and the promise of elections. And in February 
1990, South African nationalist party leader Frederik de Klerk 
announced the "unbanning" of the African National Congress, 
released Nelson Mandela from prison, and took the first steps 
toward negotiating a peaceful transfer of power from the White 
minority to the Black majority. 
In 1979, Hans Morgenthau, the great scholar of international 
relations, confessed to a friend: "I am extremely pessimistic. In my 
opinion the world is moving ineluctably toward a third world 
war—a strategic nuclear war. I do not believe that anything can be 
done to prevent it" (Boyle, 1985, p. 73). Three months later, 
George Kistiakowsky (a chemist and presidential science advisor 
who helped to develop the atomic bomb) told a Harvard audience 
that "I personally think that the likelihood for an initial use of 
nuclear warheads is really quite great between now and the end of 
this century" (Boyle, 1985, p. 73). Yet the millennium has come, 
and we are still here, without the use (so far) of nuclear warheads 
or a third world war. 
Concessions, Compromise, and the Resolution of Conflict 
The Necessity of Concessions 
If wars are frequent and human beings are often violent toward 
each other, it is also true that humans can (and often do) compro­
mise to avoid conflict escalation and war. The essence of every 
conflict is a clash of two or more incompatible desires, claims, or 
principles: One party (person, group, or nation-state) wants, 
claims, or supports something that is also wanted, claimed, or 
opposed by another party. For conflicts to be resolved (at least in 
the absence of some creative win-win option), therefore, one side 
must make a concession, giving up some previously announced 
claim (also called a conciliatory initiative; see Pruitt, 1998, p. 
490). Concessions may be mutual. They may emerge from discus­
sion and negotiation, the threat of force, or the suggestion of a
party. They may be motivated by the highest ethical principles or 
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driven by tear of consequences. They may be disguised or "sweet­ f .  t
ened" by processes of reframing, redefinition, or other creative r ti  
negotiation and mediation techniques (Fisher  Ury, 1991; Pruitt,  & , 1; r itt, 
1983; Rubin, 1981). In every case, however, concessions are the; i . ).   , , i   t  
fundamental building block of conflict resolution.f t l il i  l  f fli t r l ti . 
To be successful, of course, concessions must ultimately be,  
reciprocated. The course of negotiations, in international diplo­ 
macy as well as in the laboratory, usually involves the orchestra­     
tionti of a complex combination of elements (demands, threats,l  i ti   l t  , t t , 
promises, concessions, and even third-party interventions) intoi tr i , i ,   t ir - rt  i t r ti )
overall strategies (see Patchen, 1987; also Carnevale  Pruitt,r ll tr t i  (  t , ; l  r l  & r itt, 
1992; Lebow, 1996, chapters 6-8; Pruitt, 1998; Rubin, 1994).; e , , c a ters - ; r itt, ; i , ). 
Still, one side usually has to take the first step. Thus, on Octo­till, one side usually has to take the first step. hus, on cto­
ber 24, 1962, Khrushchev answered Kennedy's proclamation ofber 24, 1962. hrushchev ans ered ennedy's procla ation of aa 
limited blockade with defiance: "The Soviet government cannotli ited blockade ith defiance: "The Soviet govern ent cannot 
instruct the captains of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba to observeinstruct the captains of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba to observe 
the instructions of American naval forces blockading that island" the instructions of American naval forces blockading that island" 
(Fursenko & Naftali. 1997, p. 256). On the next day, however, he(Fursenko & Naftali. 1997, p. 256). On the next day, however, he 
told the meeting of the Presidium of the Soviet Communist Partytold the meeting of the Presidium of the Soviet Communist Party 
that he would order four ships that were transporting missiles tothat he would order four ships that were transporting missiles to 
Cuba to turn around and would propose the removal of missiles inCuba to turn around and would propose the removal of missiles in 
exchange for an American pledge not to invade Cuba—this set inexchange for an American pledge not to invade Cuba-this set in 
motion the exchange of messages between Khrushchev andmotion the exchange of messages between Khrushchev and 
Kennedy that ultimately shaped the resolution of the crisis.Kennedy that ultimately shaped the resolution of the crisis. 
It is important to realize that concessions may not always be   
appropriate, wise, or good in the retrospective view of history.,   . 
Thus, although most people would agree that the mutual conces­, lt  t l  l   t t t  t l 
sions that resolved the Cuban Missile Crisis may have preventedi  t t r l  t   i il  ri i    r t  a 
thermonuclear holocaust, many would argue that the one-sidedt er clear l ca st, a  l  ar e t at t e e-si e  
concessions of the 1938 Munich agreement only postponed (andconcessions of the 1938 unich agree ent only postponed (and 
may even have made more likely) the outbreak of World War II.ay even have ade ore likely) the outbreak of orld ar II. 
The Costs off Concessions 
Concessions usually involve costs, both real and symbolic.  
Although concessions may be appropriate under certain conditions 
(Morgenthau, 1967, pp. 61-62; see also Jervis, 1976), an insatia­. 
ble and powerful opponent may respond with further demandsl   l t   it  t   
instead of  reciprocal concession (Lebow, 1996, p. 78). Thus,i t  f a r i r l i  ( , , . ). , 
making  concession may not ultimately prevent  war. Over 2,000i  a i   t lti t l  r t a r. r ,  
years ago, the Roman lawyer and political leader Cicero (trans.ears a , t e a  la er a  litical lea er icer  (tra s. 
1953, p. 527) asked, "What can be done against force without1953, p. 527) asked, " hat can be done against force ithout 
force?"' Schmookler's (1984) analysis of the "ways of power"force?'" Sch ookler's (1984) analysis of the " ays of po er" 
suggests that the reply should be, "Not much." suggests that the reply should be, " ot uch." 
In the minds of several generations of American leaders, the    
apparent failure of the 1938 Munich and 1945 Yalta agreements  
thoroughly discredited concessions and appeasement. As Clark 
Clifford (1946/1968) advised President Harry Truman in  1946li f rd /  i  i t   i  a  
memorandum  thatt t was to guide U.S. policy toward the Soviett  i  . . li  t  t  i t 
Union in the late 1940s: "The language of military power is thei  i  t  l t  :  l   ilit   i  t  
only language the disciples of power . . .  . Compromise f  understand .   
and concessions are considered, by the Soviets, to be evidence of   f 
weakness and they're encouraged by our 'retreats' to make new'    ' '  
and greater demands" (p. 477).  
Concessions may be misinterpreted as signs of weakness, capit­ t  f 
ulation, or collapse (Schelling, 1963, pp. 71, 111). For example, 111   
during the Cuban Missile Crisis, when U.S. Secretary of State  f  
Dean Rusk learned that the ships had turned back from the block­   
ade line, he exclaimed  National Security Advisor McGeorge.  to    
"We eyeball eyeball and the other fellow just
  
blinked!" (Rusk, 1990, p. 237), which seemed to frame Khrush­
Bundy,, are  to  
, , . ),  r ­
chev's action in terms of the adolescent game of "chicken." At a'    
more symbolic level, making concessions may suggest passivity l,   
and low prestige (see Morley  Stephenson, 1977, pp. 40-41, on    & t , .  
image loss). Because power relations and gender are often taken as).  
metaphors for each other (Scott, 1986; see also Rank, 1914), many;  ,  
male political leaders might even (albeit not always consciously)l  liti l l  i t  l it t l  i l  
view concessions as threats to their sexual orientation and genderi  i   t r t  t  t ir l ri t ti   r 
identity.i tit . 
Finally, concessions may be impossible to sell to constituents
  ti  
(Lebow, 1996, pp. 12,95, 104). In fact, Khrushchev's concessions, .  , ).  
during the Cuban Missile Crisis were one reason his opponents   
removed him from office two years later. As one of his most severe .    
critics claimed at that time, "We had to accept every demand and,   
condition dictated by the U .S . . .  . This incident damaged the in­ .S. .  
of government, party, armedternational prestige  our our our  
forces, while at the same time raising the authority of the United, il  t t   ti  i i  t  t it   t  it  
States" (Fursenko  Naftali, 1997, p. 354).t t   & t li, , . . 
If we understood the psychological factors that led political 
leaders to make concessions instead of escalations, we might be 
able to encourage more felicitous outcomes like the examples 
  
 
mentioned at the beginning. To that end, this article describes two 
studies, one archival and one laboratory, designed to identifyi  
motivational factors associated with the choice of concession and  
compromise, rather than escalation and aggression, in  conflicti , t  t  l ti   i , i  a li t 
situation. We also wanted to explore the relation between people'sit ti .  l  t  t  l  t  l ti  t  l '  
images of concession and their actual offering of concessions.i  f i   t ir t l ff ri  f i . 
Psychological Research on Concessions
  
Although the word concessions appears only three times in the 
index of the most recent Handbook offSocial Psychology (Gilbert,  
Fiske,  Lindzey, 1998) and not at all in either of the most recent &    
handbooks of personality research, the topic of concession making   
involves  wide variety of cognate concepts and literature, includ­ a  
ing, at the least, the following: bargaining, negotiation, decision 
making, conflict resolution, power and dominance, aggression,t  
altruism, trust, deference, conformity and compliance, submission,lt i , t t, , it   li , i i , 
and appeasement. t. However, ther, t  corer  generalizations about ther li ti  t t  
antecedents of making versus withholding concessions are drawnt t  f i  r  it l i  i  r  r  
from the enormous literature on social conflict and negotiation.fr  t e e r s literat re  s cial c flict a  e tiati . 
Much of the review that follows is based on Carnevale and Pruittuch of the revie  that follo s is based on arnevale and ruitt 
(1992), Druckman (1994, 1997), Pruitt (1998), Pruitt and Rubin(1992), ruck an (1994, 1997), ruitt (1998), ruitt and ubin 
(1986), and Thompson (1990). (See Morley  Stephenson, 1977,(1986), and ho pson (1990). ( ee orley & tephenson, 1977, 
for  review of earlier work; see Kriesberg, 1998, and Kriesbergfor aa revie  of earlier ork; see riesberg, 1998, and riesberg & 
Thorson, 1991, for reviews that draw extensively on the history ofThorson, 1991, for revie s that dra  extensively on the history of 
international relations.)international relations.) 
Structural and  Situational Factors 
The likelihood of one or both parties offering concessions in a f   ring  
conflict or negotiation situation is affected by many structural andlict i   ted   
situational factors, such as the following: the number of partiesl  f  
(bilateral vs. multilateral); the institutional framework (e.g., judi­
 l r  
[ Cicero's letter, written in 44 B.C.E., was addressed to his ally Cassius'   
during the hectic months  after the assassination of Julius Caesar.t r ti  f  
cial vs. religious atonement); the site and physical setting 
negotiations (e.g., the "shape of the table" that was so controversial 
.  off 
 
in the Vietnam peace negotiations in the early 1970s); the agenda, 
decision rules, and normative structure; the public visibility of the  
negotiating parties (e.g., through presence of the media or other  
audience); the existence of deadlines and time pressures; thei ; t  i t   li   ti  ; t  
number and of issues under discussion; and thet  initialr  naturet r  f i  r i i ;  i iti l 
positions of the parties and consequent distance between theseiti  f t  rti   t i t  t  t  
positions. More abstractly, the incentive structure (or "payoffsiti s. re a stractl , t e i ce ti e str ct re ( r " a ff 
matrix") represents the possible gains and losses to each party, asatrix") represents the possible gains and losses to each party, as 
consequence of their combined decisions and responses.aa consequence of their co bined decisions and responses. 
Relational  Factors 
Most negotiating parties have  previous history of negotiating a   
with each other and with other parties; frequently this history is  
said to furnish lessons or heuristics that are applied, rightly or   
wrongly (Khong, 1992; Neustadt  & May, 1986), to frame the 
current negotiation. Depending on the interests of each side, it may  
be easier or  to discover (or construct) common overarching i   harder t  i   t t   i  
interests that can help to bridge areas of disagreement. At any pointi t r t  t t  l  t  ri  r  f i r t. t  i t 
during the actual negotiations, the cumulative history of the currentri  t  t l ti ti , t  l ti  i t r  f t  rr t 
process itself—the complex and dynamic sequence ofr cess itself-t  c le  a  a ic se e ce f requests,re ests, 
demands, threats, concessions, compromises, reciprocity (or itsde ands, threats, concessions, co pro ises, reciprocity (or its 
lack)—exerts powerful effects on the next steps (Morley  Ste­lack)-exerts po erful effects on the next steps ( orley & Ste­
phenson, 1977, pp. 85-101). Thus, we can speak of  (whenphenson, 1977, pp. 85-101). Thus, e can speak of ripenessripeness ( hen 
the "time is ripe" for intervention, for making a concession, forthe "ti e is ripe" for intervention, for aking a concession, for 
compromise, etc.; see Kriesberg & Thorson, 1991) andcompromise, etc.; see Kriesberg & Thorson, 1991) and turningturning 
in the negotiation process (Druckman, 1997, p. 99; 2000).pointspoints in the negotiation process (Druckman, 1997, p. 99; 2000). 
Individual Factors 
Individual negotiating parties and individual persons differ inr  
their willingness to make concessions. For example, the gender 
and cultural backgrounds of negotiators affect how they negotiate. t  
Bureaucratic politics—that is, the perceived domestic social, eco­litics-t   
nomic, and political constituencies and support structures (and 
opposition structures) of each party—often exert substantial ef­iti  t t    rty-o  t t ti l 
fects on ostensibly external negotiations. And the kind of advancef t   t i l  t r l ti ti .  t  i  f  
preparation negotiators undertake (thinking about strategy vs. is­re arati  e tiat rs erta e (t i i  a t strate  s. is­
sues) affects their subsequent level of compromise behavior. At­sues) affects their subsequent level of co pro ise behavior. t­
tributions, especially about the situation and traits of the negotiat­tributions, especially about the situation and traits of the negotiat­
ing counterpart, are also critically important (Morris, Larrick, &ing counterpart, are also critically i portant ( orris, Larrick, & 
Su, 1999).Su, 1999). 
The meta-analysis of compromising behavior inOrientation..    
negotiation by Druckman (1994) suggested that individual differ­if
ences vs. cooperative) is one of thein orientation (competitive .   
most powerful predictors of negotiation behavior. The concept ofl   f 
was developed by Deutsch (1982), whopsychologicali l orientation  
defined it as an amalgam of cognitive, motivational, and moral    
elements. Thus  cooperative (vs. competitive) orientation would a   
include perception of the negotiation process as non-zero-sum (vs.i l  ti   t  ti ti     . 
zero-sum), the other side as  partner (vs. opponent or enemy), and a .  
the best outcome as maximum joint gain. It would include trust andt  t t   i  j i t i . It l  i l  t t  
the desire for affiliation (vs. aggressive or dominance motives) andti  .  
be grounded in an egalitarian (vs. exploitative) moral stance. In.  
most laboratory research, orientations are directly manipulated by  
experimental instructions, although they are sometimes (e.g.,   
measured prior differenceDruckman, 1967)  as individual diff  
variables. 
Deutsch's (1982) use of  variety of dif­Personality factors.  a  i
ferent individual difference constructs to define and describe co­ 
operative and competitive orientations has certainly enriched their 
connotative meaning. On the other hand, this inclusiveness has led 
to a certain operational confusion and proliferation. Indeed,i  as 
Grzelak (1994, p. 192) noted, orientation is often measured by.  
outcome—a procedure that confuses independent and dependenttcome-    
variables and invites circularity. It is useful, therefore, to review 
the literature relating several specific personality variables, mea­t  lit t  l ti  l i i  lit  i l , 
sured by methods with established validity, that could plausibly be  t  it  t li  li it , t t l  l i l   
considered as components of the cooperative versus competitivei r   t  f t  r ti  r  titi  
orientation.2orientation? 
Personality traits are related to negotiating behavior, in real life 
as well as in laboratory studies. Thus, in an  archival study off 
20th-century American presidents and secretaries of state, Ether­ 
edge (1978) demonstrated that extraverts advocated force, whereas 
introverts were inclined to promote  Several cognitive compromise.  
variables are related to cooperative behavior, especially in situa­
tions of crisis and negotiation (see Voss  Dorsey, 1992; Winter,ti   i i   ti ti    & , ; i t , 
1992). Archival studies by Suedfeld and his associates (Suedfeld. i l t i   1   i  i t  l  & 
Tetlock, 1977; Tetlock,tl , ; tl , 1979; Wallace, Suedfeld,  Thachuk,; ll , f l , & , 
1993) demonstrated the connection between integrative complex­) e strate  t e c ecti  et ee  i te rati e c le ­
ity and peaceful resolution of international crises. In contrast,it  a  eacef l res l ti  f i ter ati al crises. I  c trast, 
right-wing authoritarianism is associated with escalation in labo­right- ing authoritarianis  is associated ith escalation in labo­
ratory simulations (Altemeyer, 1996, pp. 130-136).ratory si ulations ( lte eyer, 1996, pp. 130-136). 
Several different kinds of studies have linked coop­Motives.. t  
eration and competition to one particular element of personality,   
namely motives (particularly implicit motives; see McClelland, 
Koestner,  Weinberger, 1989). Implicit motives are measured &   
through content analysis of verbal material, using the empirically  
derived content-analysis scoring systems developed by McClel­
land and his colleagues (see Winter, 1998; also Smith, 1992, for  a 
discussion of methodological and psychometric issues). For exam­i i   t l i l  t i  i .  
ple, power motivation (a concern for impact, prestige, and repu­l , r ti ti  (  r  f r i t, r ti ,  r ­
tation) is often associated with verbal and physical aggression (seet ti ) i  ft  i t  it  r l  i l r i  (  
Winter, 1996, chapter 5) and an exploitative, aggressive negotia­i ter, , c a ter ) a  a  e l itati e, a ressi e e tia­
tion style (see Schnackers  Kleinbeck, 1975; Terhune, 1968,tion style (see chnackers & leinbeck, 1975; erhune, 1968, 
1970). In contrast, affiliation motivation (a concern for close,1970). In contrast, affiliation otivation (a concern for close, 
friendly relations among people and groups) is often linked tofriendly relations a ong people and groups) is often linked to 
cooperative behavior, at least under "safe" conditions. Table 1cooperative behavior, at least under "safe" conditions. Table I 
provides a brief description of the content-analysis scoring andprovides a brief description of the content-analysis scoring and 
associated actions and outcomes for these two motives.associated actions and outcomes for these two motives. 
Motivation should affect concession making: directly, in termst  
of leading people to make (or emit) concessions, and indirectly,  
both by affecting people's  construals, and evaluationsi   perceptions,  
of others' responses and finally by guiding their own responses to   
these responses. Studies in which leaders' motives are measured at 
distance have shown that leaders scoring high in power motiva­a 
2 Space does not pennit a review of the age-old debate about the relative2 rm   
importance of structural and situational versus individual factors in deter­  
mining political and social outcomes. Greenstein (1969/1987, Chap. 2)/   
suggested that the personalities of individual actors do play an important  
role in situations that are new or unstructured, are emotionally arousing, 
and involve unclear expectations. All of these features are certainly char­ i l  l r t ti . ll  t  f t r  r  rt i l  r­
acteristic of most conflict situations.t risti  f st fli t sit ti s. 
Table 1I 
Behavior  Correlates off the Affiliationi  and Power  Motives 
Motive characteristic Affiliation motiveti   Power motive 
Verbal images scored Concern about establishing, maintaining, Concern about having impact, control, 
or restoring friendly relations among or influence on another person,  
persons or groups group, or the world at large by 
strong forceful actions, controllingl  
or regulating others, trying to 
influence or persuade, unsolicited 
or acquiring prestigehelping,  
Actions Cooperative and friendly when "safe"; Depending on level of responsibility,  
defensive and even hostile under threat either successful leadership andl  
high subordinates' morale or 
profligate impulsivity  
Negotiating style Cooperative when safe; defensive and Exploitative, aggressive 
hostile under threat 
Seeks help from Friends and similar others 
tend be wartion to aggressive and involve their countries in  
(Winter, 1980, 1992). Finally, in content-analysis studies of archi­ 
val materials such as cultural documents and government mes­
sages, high levels of power motivation are associated with subse­ 
quent war entry, whereas high levels of affiliation motivation aret  t ,  i  l l   ili ti n ti ti   
often associated with avoidance of war or at least ending warft  i t  it  i  f r r t l t i  r 
(Winter, 1993, 1997).( i ter, , ). 
A laboratory study of conflict escalation by Peterson, Winter, 
and Doty (1994) showed that when one side expressed higher 
 t 
power and lower affiliation motive imagery (vs. lower power andti n .  
higher affiliation motive imagery), the other side responded in kindti   
(higher power and lower affiliation), as well as with higher levels,  
of 3f aggression.r i . 3 
Overall, then, there is strong ground for believing that the 
affiliation motive is at the core of the cooperative orientation andti n   
that, in negotiation situations, it should therefore be associated 
with making concessions and accepting the concessions of others.  
In contrast, the power motive should be an important component of t t, t   ti  l    i t t t f 
the competitive orientation and should be associated with resis­t  titi  ri t ti   l   i t  it  r i ­
tance to making concessions, or rejecting concessions made by theta ce t  a i  c cessi s, r rejecti  c cessi s a e  t e 
other side. The research reported in this article was designed toother side. he research reported in this article as designed to 
explore these general hypotheses in two very different ways: (a)explore these general hypotheses in t o very different ays: (a) 
through content analysis of archival data drawn from actual dip­through content analysis of archival data dra n fro  actual dip­
lomatic negotiations and (b) through a laboratory simulation oflo atic negotiations and (b) through a laboratory si ulation of 
negotiationnegotiation duringduring the Cuban Missile Crisis. Wee agree withithCubanthe issile Crisis. agree 
Grezelak's (1994,rezelak's (1994, p.p. 260) call for260) call for integrationintegration ofof laboratorylaboratory re­re­
search on conflict and cooperation orientations with field or archi­search on conflict and cooperation orientations with field or archi­
val studies of "real-life phenomena," to demonstrate that ourval studies of "real-life phenomena," to demonstrate that our 
theoretical concepts and measures are truly relevant to socialtheoretical concepts and measures are truly relevant to social 
reality (see also the  integrative review by Patchen, 1987).reality (see also the earlierearlier integrative review by Patchen, 1987). 
Thus, we proposed to relate concession making to the affiliationThus, we proposed to relate concession making to the affiliation 
and power motives—measured in both laboratory tests and archi­and power motives-measured in both laboratory tests and archi­
val government documents by the same content-analysis systems.val government documents by the same content-analysis systems. 
The concept of motive imagery, as used in this article, deserves
    
a brief conceptual discussion. We used scoring systems that were  
developed in the tradition of personality research, where individual
  
Thematic Apperception Test protocols were content analyzed to 
measure the motives of individual persons (see Winter, 1998).  
When applied to speeches, diplomatic communications, and other 
documents usually produced by collectivities, we cannot be sure 
that we are measuring the motives of the persons whose name is   
Political experts 
signed to the documents. Rather, we may be measuring the mo­
tives of loosely defined leadership collectivities, or even other,   
nonmotivational concepts (see Winter, 1993, p. 535, for  detailed   a  
discussion). From an empirical perspective, the important question 
isi  whethert  theset scores predict the same kindsi  of actionsti  andi t t  
outcomes as they do among individuals. In this article, therefore,t   t    i i i l . I  t i  rti l , t r f r , 
we used the theoretically agnostic terms  ande se  t e t e reticall  a stic ter s motivetive imageryi ery a  
instead of  anddocumentsdocu ents instead of motivesotives and persons.persons. 
Study I: Developing and Validating a
 1:  
Coding System for Concessions
 
What is a canconcession, and how it be measured in both 
archival and laboratory research? On the one hand, the diplomatic 
history literature contains many examples  few precise opera­ but
tional definitions or procedures for quantification. On the other  
hand, laboratory researchers often measure concessions by seem­ 
ingly superficial variables such as the giving or exchanging ofi l  i i l i l    t  i i   i   
small sums of money or "points." Although these measures arell  f  r i t .  lt  t  r  r  
precise, they do not necessarily have anything to do with conces­recise, t e   t ecessaril  a e a t i  t   it  c ces­
sions in the real world of international relations (or, for that matter,sions in the real orld of international relations (or, for that atter, 
even significant interpersonal relationships). For the present re­even significant interpersonal relationships). or the present re­
search, therefore, we decided to construct  new measure ofsearch, therefore, e decided to construct aa ne  easure of 
concession making that could be used in both archival and labo­concession aking that could be used in both archival and labo­
ratory studies.ratory studies. 
Measuring Concessions: A Grounded Theory Approach 
review of the political and psychological 
literature (e.g., Etzioni, 1967; Kriesberg & Thorson, 1991, pp. 
On the basis of
 a  
, 
264-265), as well as intensive comparison of diplomatic docu­   
ments from  crisis that escalated to war and  similar crisis that a  a  
was peacefully resolved, Langner (1997)  developed  systemll   first  a  
for coding concessions on the basis of verbal content. The two  
crises were the outbreak of war between the United States and   
Mexico and the peaceful settlement of the U.S. dispute with Greatl  .  
3 This result is consistent with the finding of Wrightsman, Baxter,3
   
Nelson, and Bilsky (1972) that cooperation is more likely when the "other"
 
is portrayed as cooperative rather than competitive. 
Both theBritain about the Oregon boundary. were related to   
American sense of Manifest Destiny and territorial expansion to t  
the Pacific Coast, both were handled by the administration off
President James K. Polk, and both occurred during 1845 and the  
first half of 1846 (see Winter, 1997).i t l     i t , . 
The concessions scoring system is organized in terms of four   
positive categories and four parallel negative categories. The pos­
itive categories all involve proposing or accepting concessions in 
dispute:a i t : 
1. Proposals for procedural arrangements that will facilitateI.   
negotiation and peaceful resolution of  crisis;l  a  
2. Suggestions or offers of mediation by some third party (cf.   (  
Rubin, 1981); 
3. Taking, or offering to take, some specific act of de-escalationi    
(can be subdivided into unilateral and reciprocal de-escalation 
acts); and 
4.	 Accepting  concession (Categories 1-3 above) made by the  a   
other side.t  i . 
The negative categories are parallel to the positive ones, but 
involve rejecting concessions or escalating conflict: 
I. Declining or rejecting a procedural proposal made by the1.  
other side; 
2. Refusing a suggestion or offer of mediation; r  	 
3. Taking, or threatening to take, some specific act of escalation  
(can be subdivided into unilateral and reciprocal escalation); and 
4. Rejecting  proposed concession (positive Category  above)	 a  3  
made by the other side. 
Further definitions and examples of these categories are given in  
Table 2. In applying the system, the sentence is the unit of scoring.   
The eight categories are logically independent of each other, which   
Table 2
Coding System forr Scoring Concessions 
Category	 
1.	 ProceduralI.  
2.	 Mediation  
3.	 De-escalation 
4.	 Accept 
I. Oppose procedural1.	  
2. Oppose mediation	  
3. Escalation	  
4.	 Reject 
means that, in principle, each sentence could be scored for the 
presence of any category or categories.  
Cross-Validating the Concessions Measure in Archival 
Documents From Four Crises 
The first study was designed for two purposes: (a) to establish 
the real-world validity of the concessions scoring system and (b) to  
explore the relationships between affiliation and power-motiveti n  
imagery and concessions. To cross-validate the scoring system, 
diplomatici l ti  documents and other written government-to-gov­t  t  itt t t
ernment communications from two additional pairs of crises werer t i ti  fr  t  iti l ir  f ri  r  
mixed together and blindly scored for concessions and motivei  t t r  li l  r  f r i   ti  
imagery. Each pair consisted of  peacefully resolved crisis andi a er . ac  air c siste  f aa eacef ll  res l e  crisis a  aa 
similar crisis (involving approximately the same countries, duringsi ilar crisis (involving approxi ately the sa e countries, during 
the samesa e historical era) that escalated toto armed conflict. Thisar ed conflict.the historical era) that escalated  This 
method has been characterized by George (1979) asethod has been characterized by eorge (1979) as structuredstructured 
(or  which is a typefocusedfocused comparisonco parison (or disciplineddisciplined configurative),configurative), hich is a type 
of historically grounded theory development: Comparable individ­of historically grounded theory development: Comparable individ­
ual cases, with different outcomes, are described, analyzed, andual cases, with different outcomes, are described, analyzed, and 
explained in terms of theoretically relevant general variables.explained in terms of theoretically relevant general variables. 
The first matched pair consisted of the 1938 crisis over German   
demands to annex parts of Czechoslovakia, which was peacefully  
resolved at the Munich series of conferences among Germany,   
Great Britain, France, and Italy that averted (perhaps unwisely, and 
in any case only for  few months) war. It was paired with the 1939 a  
crisis over German demands to annex Danzig and modify theti i     t  i   i
German-Polish boundary. That crisis ended on September 1, 1939,li  . t i i    t  I, , 
with the outbreak of World War II, as Germany invaded Poland.it  t  t r  f rl  r II,  r  i  l . 
Both of these crises arose from German expansion and involvedt  f t ese crises ar se fr  er a  e a si  a  i l e  
Definition and example
  
Positive categories 
Proposals for procedural arrangements that will facilitate negotiation and peaceful resolution of  crisis. Example:
l  a  
"We are prepared to set one single date if that would facilitate the task."
 
 
Suggestions or offers of mediation by some third party. Example: "If desired, I am willing to arrange for the  f  
representatives of  third party at the discussion."  a  
Taking, or offering to take, some specific act of de-escalation, not contingent on response of other side.
Unilateral:l: i      
Example: "I am willing to eliminate harmful military expenditures and focus on maintaining peaceful relations
l l  
between our countries."
 
Reciprocal: Taking, or offering to take, some specific act of de-escalation, contingent on response of other side.i     
Example: "I assure you that if you adhere to the tenets of our agreement, eliminating the specified weapons, we    
will not attack." 
Accepting  concession (Categories 1-3 above) made by the other side. Example: "I will agree to your public a    
declaration that you are not supplying weapons and will agree not to invade." 
Negative categories 
Declining or rejecting  procedural proposal (positive Category 1 above) made by the other side. Example: "Further a I   
communication between our diplomats is proving unproductive at this point, and therefore our representatives will  
be returning home." 
Refusing  suggestion or offer of mediation. Example: "This government is not willing to involve  third party in the a r  '    a  
current dispute." 
Taking, or threatening to take, some specific act of escalation, not contingent on response of other side.Unilateral:t l:     
Example: "We are prepared to halt your military shipments and will do so by stopping and examining your ships." 
Taking, or threatening to take, some specific act of escalation, contingent on response of other side.Reciprocal:     
Example: "If you break our agreement of nonviolence, we will retaliate."f    
Rejecting  proposed concession (positive Category  above) made by the other side. Example: "I cannot accept your a  3  
promise of not supplying weapons and therefore will not guarantee anything."  
Britain and Germany major antagonists. The other 
matched pair consisted of two crises over Cuba that involved the 
Great
 
 as
  
 
  
United States and the former Soviet Union: the disastrous 1961 
Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba by Cuban exiles, who were in fact   
organized, financed, and directed by the United States (Fursenko 
Naftali, 1997), and the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, in& , ,  
which the United States and Soviet Union narrowly averted nu­i  t  it  t t   i t i  l  t  
clear war. Although the Bay of Pigs lasted for only  few days, itl r r. lt  t   f i  l t  f r l  a f  , it 
was clearly  war, complete with bombing, aerial combat, and l rl  a r, l t  it  i , ri l t,  
intensei te se groundr  betweenet ee  the Cubana  army andafighting t e thet efi ti  ar  
American-trained and American-supplied invaders.erica -trai e  a  erica -s lie  i a ers. 
The first hypothesis of the archival study is that the documents  
from the two peacefully resolved crises will score higher in totalll   
and positive concessions and lower in negative concessions than 
documents from the two war crises. The second hypothesis is that 
across all documents, the number of positive concessions will be ll t , t    iti  i  ill  
positively correlated with affiliation motivation and negativelyiti l  rr l t  it  ffili ti  ti ti   ti l  
correlated with power motivation and that for negative conces­c rrelate  it  er ti ati  a  t at f r e ati e c ces­
sions, these correlations will be reversed.si s, t ese c rrelati s ill e re erse . 
Method 
The first step we took was to establish preciseSelection offdocuments.  
beginning and ending dates. On the basis of the discussion in Watt (1989),  
the Munich crisis was considered to have begun on May 22, 1938, and   
ended on September 29, 1938, whereas the Poland crisis began on   
March 31, 1939 and ended on September 3, 1939. Dates for the Bay of Pigs   
(April 6-22, 1961) and Cuban Missile Crisis (October 22-28, 1962) were 196  
based on the dates of the  and last documents available for 4  t  t   t  firsti t  l t t  il l   scoring.i .4 
For each crisis, all documents representing official government publici l m  
statements or government-to-government communications were drawn t   
from the collection of documents assembled by Winter (1997) from pub­  
lished archival sources (see Appendix  for  list of all documents). This A  a   
yielded 32 written government-to-government communications for thei l   itt  t t t i ti   t  
Munich crisis and 16 for Poland (taken from U.S. Department of State,i  i i     l  t   . . t t  t t , 
1949. and Woodward,  r  & Butler,tl r. 1949-1954). For the two U.S.-Soviet- ). r t  t  . .- i t 
crises involving Cuba, the written government-to-government communi­ris s i l i  . t  ritt  r t-t - r t i­
cations (from U.S. Department of State, 1973) were supplemented by twoti s (fr  . . rt t f t t , ) r  s l t   t  
public statements by President John F. Kennedy (one speech and one presspublic state ents by resident John . ennedy (one speech and one press 
conference transcript) and three official Soviet public statements, for  totalconference transcript) and three official oviet public state ents, for aa total 
of seven Bay of Pigs documents and 12 Cuban Missile Crisis documents.of seven ay of Pigs docu ents and 12 uban issile risis docu ents. 
Within each of the paired crises, the documents used were comparable:ithin each of the paired crises. the docu ents used ere co parable: 
verbatim government-to-government communications for Munich and Po­verbatim government-to-government communications for unich and Po­
land and government-to-government communications plus public state­land and government-to-government communications plus public state­
ments for the Bay of Pigs and Cuban Missile Crisis.ments for the Bay of Pigs and Cuban issile Crisis. 
To the extent that we were able to match both the nature of the crises and  
the type of documents scored within each pair, within-pair differences can   
be attributed (whether as cause or effect) to the different outcomes—peace  t es-pe  
or war—of the two crises.ar-   
Documents from all four crises were mixedScoring off documents.  
together in random order and scored for concessions by two scorers who 
had been trained by Carrie Langner. To avoid bias, scoring of concessions  
was done by two scorers who were unaware of the purpose and hypotheses  
of the research and who had little knowledge of the four specific crises. The   
scorers were trained in the use of the scoring system by Langner.  
On  portion of these documentary materials that had also been scored a   
by Langner, these two scorers attained category agreement figures (see.  
Smith, 1992, p. 529) with Langner of .75 and .63. Both scorers scored all. .  .  
documents, resolving all disagreements after discussion. Because the doc­
 
uments varied in length, the raw concessions scores for each document 
were divided by the number of words and multiplied by 1,000 to give a  
figure of concessions per 1,000 words. Finally, subtracting negative con­  
cessions from positive concessions scores gave a net concessions score.  
These documents had previously been scored for affiliation and power­ti  -
motive imagery according to the integrated running-text scoring system 
(Winter, 1991) as  part of Winter's (1997) study, by  trained scorer who a   a  
was blind to the hypotheses and the historical details of the crises and who  
had previously demonstrated high reliability (category agreement a .85)e ent""  
on materials precoded by expert scorers. Scores for each motive were also 
expressed in terms of images per 1,000 words. To avoid the theoretical     
issue of whether impersonal documents or their collective authors can havei   t  i l t   t i  ll ti  t    
motives or motivation (as individual persons do; see Winter, 1993), as wellti   ti ti   i i i l  ;  i t . ,  ll 
as the conceptual status of the motive imagery measures, we used thes t  t l st t s f t  ti  i r  s r s,  s  t  
theoretically more neutral term motive imagery to refer to these scores.t r ti ll  r  tr l t r  ti  i r  t  r f r t  t s  s r s. 
Resultsults 
Validity off the concessions measure. Descriptive statistics for 
all variables, for each crisis, are presented in Table 3. Two-way .  
analyses of variance, with crisis outcome (war vs. peace) and crisis  
era (1930s vs. 1960s) as main factors, were carried out on the.  
concessions scores. The results show only  trend in the predicted a  
direction for positive concessions, peacefully resolved crises werei ti   iti  i , ll  l  i   
higher, F(l, 63) = 2.26, p = .138;  significant predicted effectsi r, (l, )  . , P  . ; butt i ifi t r i t  ff t  
for negative concessions, war crises were higher, F(l, 63) = 10.05,f r ti  i , r ri  r  i r, (l, )  . , 
pP = .002; and net concessions, peace crises were higher, F(l,. ; a  et c cessi s, eace crises ere i er, (l, 
63) = 5.65, p = .021. There  also  near-significant main effect63)  5.65,p  .021. here wasas also aa near-significant ain effect 
for era on positive concessions—the 1930s crises were higher, F( 1,for era on positive concessions-the 1930s crises ere higher, F( 1, 
63) = 3.60,  = .063. Only one Outcome X Era interaction was of63)  3.60, pp  .063. nly one utco e X Era interaction as of 
borderline significance: The war-peace difference in negative con­borderline significance: The ar-peace difference in negative con­
cessions was greater for the two 1930s crises than for the twocessions as greater for the t o 1930s crises than for the t o 
crises of the 1960s, F(l, 63) == 3.82,3.82, pp = .055.crises of the 1960s, F(l, 63)  .055. 
Overall, then, the concessions scores differentiate the war andi t   
peace crises of both historical eras in the predicted ways. In one  
sense, these initial results may seem obvious because, almost by 
definition, peaceful crisis resolution involves one or both sidesl  
making positive concessions, and war results from negative con­
cessions. The real point of this first study, however, was toi .  l i t  t i  i t t , ,  t  
demonstrate the validity of the concessions scoring system on realt t  t  li it   t  i  i  t   l 
archival material drawn from major international crises.i l t i l   j  i t ti l i . 
The trend for documents from the two U.S.-Soviet crises of
  
1961-1962 to contain fewer positive concessions than the two 
British-German crises from 1938-1939 may be due  to many    
factors: the much more protracted nature of the Munich and Poland  
crises compared with the two Cuban crises, differences in the  
nature and number of issues at stake, and the historical differencest     i  t t ,  t  i t i l diff  
ini  government-to-government communication technology andr t-t - r t i ti  t l   
style.t l . 
Motive imagery and concessions.. Table 4 shows the relation­
ship between motive imagery scores and both kinds of concessions  
scores, across all 67 documents from the four crises. As shown in 
the top part of the table, affiliation motive imagery is positively ti   
4 The first air strikes occurred on April 15. The actual invasion began on4   
April 17 and effectively ended on April 19. Because of  paucity of official i ly .  a  f  
government-to-government documents, as well as public statements, it wast  
necessary to include documents through April 22, by which time Kennedy  
was already commissioning an investigation of the failed operation (Korn­ l  i i i   i ti ti   t  il  ti  
bluh, 1998, pp. 303-320). Because  study was designed not to predictl , , . .  thist i  t   i  t t  i t 
the outbreak of war but rather to validate the concessions scoring system,t  t r  f r t r t r t  li t  t  ssi s s ri  s st . 
should not be  problem. One would certainly predict that communi­thisthis should not be aa proble . ne ould certainly predict that co uni­
cations during  war itself, like communications before the war, containcations during aa ar itself, like co unications before the ar, contain 
few positive concessions.fe  positive concessions. 
Table 33 
Descriptivei  Statistics forf  Concessions in Documents From Four Crisesi s 
Crisis 
Munich (peace) 
Poland (war) 
Difference  (peace ­- war) wa
Cuban Missile Crisis (peace) 
Bay of Pigs (war) 
Difference  (peace ­- war) 
 r) 
wa
Positive 
concessions 
n M SDS  
1930s crises 
32 3.57  6.186.  
16 1.43  1.99.  
2.14  
1960s crises 
12 0.77  0.970.  
7  0.05 0.120.  
0.72  
Negative 
concessions 
M SD  
0.25 
1.96 
-1.71 
6 
 
0.54 
2.80 
 
 
0.55 
0.61 
-0.06 .  
0.89 
1.05 
 
 
Nett 
concessions'1ce sions· 
M SD 
3.32 
-0.53 
3.85 
 
.  
6.21 
3.96  
0.22 
-0.56 
0.78 
 
.  
 
1.59 
1.09 
 
 
a Number of positive concessions categories scored minus number of negative concessions categories scoreda  
(each per 1,000 words).
   
posItIve concessionsassociated with i i concessions  net and and t  an  
negatively associated with negative concessions (i.e., rejecting
   
concessions), whereas power motive imagery shows the reverse
   
pattern. Considering both motive imagery scores together yielded    
high beta regression coefficients for each of the two motives and  i ients    
high multiple correlations for the combined effect of the two   ct  two 
motives. As shown in the lower parts of the table, the overall         
pattern is similar for both the peace and war crises. Furthertt  i  i il   t  t    r i . t  
analyses showed that the pattern of correlation and regressionl s s s  t t t  tt r  f rr l ti   r r ssi  
coefficients is robust across the four individual crises, the countriesffi i ts is r st r ss t  f r i i i l ris s, t  tri s 
issuing the documents, the outcome (war or peace), and the his­iss i  t e c e ts, t e tc e ( ar r eace), a  t e is­
torical era. These results linking motive imagery to concessions aret rical era. ese res lts li i  ti e i a er  t  c cessi s are 
consistent with previous archival and laboratory studies.consistent ith previous archival and laboratory studies. 
Concessions and Motive Imagery: Separate Concepts or 
Shared Method Variance? 
Overall, these results from the archival study demonstrate that 
the concessions measures show the predicted relationships both tot  
actual crisis outcomes and to motive imagery. However, because  
motive imagery and concessions were scored from the same doc­
uments, these latter results might arguably reflect shared method 
variance (i.e., overlap of the two content analysis scoring systems),   
rather than actual relationships between two separate, independentt  t  t l l ti i  t  t  t , i t 
sets of concepts.t   t . 
Several comments can be made in response to such a concern.     
First, the manifest contents of the two scoring systems are, in fact,
  t, 
very distinct (d. Tables 1 and 2). The actual scoring of documentscf .  
for concessions and motives was carried out by two scorers, at two,  
different times; each scorer was unaware of the scorings made byt ;  
the other. Moreover, the magnitudes of the correlations and re­e e d re­
gression coefficients reported in Table 3, although highly signifi­t   , si i
cant, indicate that the two scoring systems are empirically distinct  
even if they are also conceptually related.re also conceptual y related. 
A close analysis of the documents shows that specific positive  
and negative concessions are phrased in a variety of ways that do  
not necessarily entail imagery of any particular motive (see also  
Winter & Stewart, 1977, p. 51). To illustrate this point, we cite five , . ). 
kinds of examples (motive images are underlined, whereas pas­ 
sages scored for concessions are in small capitals).  in s al  capitals). 
1. Sometimes, to be sure, motive images and positive or nega­  
tive concessions seem intrinsically connected, as in this threat byl      b  
President Kennedy (J. Kennedy, 1961) to Soviet Premier Khrush­t    
chev during the April 1961 Bay of Pigs crisis: i  t  il    i  i i : 
In the event of any military intervention [Power image] by outside    outside 
force we will immediately HONOR OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE INTER­       
A M E R I C A  N  SYSTEM  TO PROTECT THIS HEMISPHERE AGAINST EXTERNAL     
AGGRESSION. (Kennedy, 1961, p. 286) [negative concession: escala­. . )  
tion—reciprocal; would also be Power if this sentence had not already-reciproc l  
been scored for Power motive imagery]    ti  i  
Table 4 
Correlations and Standardized Regression Coefficients off 
Concessions Scores Witht  Motive Imagery in Crisis Documents 
Crisis type and  
concessions scores 
Positive concessions  
Negative concessions  
Net concessions 
Positive concessions  
Negative concessions  
Net concessions 
Positive concessions  
Negative concessions  
Net concessions 
t pp < .10.. .  .05.* p < .05. 
Correlation with 
Affiliation Power 
motivation motivation 
r rf3 f3 
All crises (N =  67) 
.19 .50*** -.22t  -.52***.52  
- .16  - . 3 1~.3  * .07 .25t. t 
.23t  .55*** -.22t  -.55***.5  
Peace: crises rises (n(n = 44)  
.18 .54** - .23  -.56**.5  
- .16  - .26  - .00  .16 
.20 .56** - .22  -.57**.5  
War crises (nn = 23)  
- .05  .13 - .33  - .38  
- .27  - .46tA  .19 .40t. t 
.18 .411AI t - .32  - .50* 
.01.*** p < . 1. *** p  .'001. P < . 
Often, however, positive or negative concessions occur with­2.   
out any motive imagery. Here are two examples from the diplo­
    
matic messages exchanged by German Foreign Minister Ribben­   
trop and British Foreign Secretary Halifax during the 1938 Munich   
crisis: 
It goes without saying that WE CANNOT ALLOW OURSELVES TO ENTER    
UPON ANY DISCUSSION about internal military measures. (Woodward  t l  ard & 
Butler, 1949-1954, Vol. 2, pp. 127-129) [Negative concession: re­. , l. , . ) i  i : re
jecting process]i  r  
His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has instructed mety's t ry   irs  ted  
t o TRANSMIT TO THE FUHRER AND REICH CHANCELLOR THE ENCLOSED I   E     E ENCLOSED 
PLAN WHICH REPRESENTS  REASONABLE SCHEME FOR THE CESSION OF S A    E   
THE SUDETEN GERMAN AREA TO GERMANY, as accepted in principle by   ,  
the Czech Government. (U.S. Department of State, 1949, pp. 986­ t. . . t ent , . 986­
988) [Positive: de-escalation—unilateral]de-escalat -unilateral  
Another example of concessions without motive imagery is from      
Khrushchev's October 27, 1962, letter to President Kennedy dur­     d
ing the Cuban Missile Crisis:  
I therefore make this proposal: WE ARE WILLING TO REMOVE FROM  l:      
CUBA THE MEANS WHICH YOU REGARD AS OFFENSIVE.  WE ARE WILLING    .    
TO CARRY THIS OUT AND TO MAKE THIS PLEDGE IN THE UNITED NATIONS.   
YOUR REPRESENTATIVE WILL MAKE  DECLARATION TO THE EFFECT THATI E  A I   
THE UNITED STATES, FOR ITS PART, CONSIDERING THE UNEASINESS AND  ,  S , I    A  
ANXIETY OF THE SOVIET STATE, WILL REMOVE ITS ANALOGOUS MEANS    ,   S   
FROM TURKEY. (U.S. Department of State, 1973, p. 648) [Positive: . . . t ent  t t , 3, . ) [ iti : 
de-escalation—reciprocal]escalation-reciprocal] 
3. Conversely, many motive images occur in the absence of   of 
positive or negative concessions, as in this passage from the same       
Khrushchev letter:  
I have already said that our people, our Government, and I personally,1 l s t r r ,   persona ly, 
as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, are concerned solely withan  il ,  r ed   
having  our country develop [Achievement image]  e ent and occupyd  ar 
worthy place among all peoples of the world [Power image] in  ll  e  r i  
economic competition, in the development of culture and the arts, andi  titi n,   ent     
in raising the living standard [Achievement image] of the people. This  r  e ent  
is the most noble and necessary field for competition, and both thei  t  t l   r  i l  r titi n,  t  t  
victor and the vanquished [Power image] will derive only benefit fromi t   t  is ed r i  ill i  l  fit fr  
, because it means peace and an increase in the means by which manitit s  it s    i r s  i  t  s  i   
lives and finds enjoyment [Affiliation image].li s  fi s j ent [ ffiliation i ]. 
Sometimes, motive and concession occur in close proximity,4.    
but the motive is an antecedent to the concession, as in another      s   
message from Halifax to Ribbentrop during the Munich crisis:     
His Majesty's Government are so greatly disturbed by the signs ofty's ent    d    of 
deterioration in the atmosphere [Affiliation image—concern at dis­r tion   re iliation age-c rn t dis­
ruption of  relationship] surrounding the negotiations at Prague andti   a l ti i ] ing t  ti ti s t  a  
by the seriousness of the consequences of any other than  peaceful t  i ss  t  ces   t  t  a pea l 
solution that they feel compelled to APPROACH THE GERMAN GOVERN­s l ti  t t t  f l lled t     ­
MENT AND TO ASK FOR THEIR COOPERATION in averting any such   SK R I  I  i  rti   s  
calamitous termination to the discussion. (Woodward & Butler,cala itous ter ination to the discussion. ( ood ard  utler, 
1949-1954, Vol. 2, pp. 277-278) [Positive concession: process;1949-1954, ol. 2, pp. 277-278) [Positive concession: process; 
would also be Affiliation if this sentence had not already been scored]ould also be ffiliation if this sentence had not already been scored] 
5, Finally, statements scored for concessions can be embedded.  i  e e  
in  series of different motive images, as in this German rejection a  rent    
of  British ultimatum at the beginning of World War II: a  t   r II: 
The German people, however, above all do not intend to allow r, ll  t   
themselves to be ill-treated by Poles [Power imagery]. The Germanl s   ted  Poles [Po er imagery]. The German 
Government therefore REJECT THE ATTEMPTS TO FORCE GERMANY, BY   , B  
MEANS OF  DEMAND [Negative concession: Rejecting  previouslyF A ti e i : ti g a pre i  
offered proposal; would also be Power if previous sentence had notred ;   r    not 
already been scored] having the character of an ultimatum, to recall its  ter ,   i  
forces which are lined up for the defence of the Reich, and thereby to       e    
accept the old unrest and the old injustice. The threat that, failing this,t  t   ,     
they will fight Germany in the war [Power image], corresponds to thet  ill i t  i  t   r i , s t  the 
intention proclaimed for years past by numerous British politicians.i t ti  l i ed   t  s iti  p liti i . 
The German Government and the German people had assured the r  r ent  t e r  l   ss r  th  
English people countless times how much they desire an understand­nglish people countless ti es ho  uch they desire an understand­
ing, indeed close friendship, with them [Affiliation image]. If theing, indeed close friendship, ith the  [ ffiliation i age]. If the 
British Government hitherto always refused these offers and nowritish overn ent hitherto al ays refused these offers and now 
answers them with an open threat of war [Power image], it is not theans ers the  ith an open threat of ar [Po er i age], it is not the 
fault of the German people. (Woodward and Butler, 1949-1954,fault of the er an people. ( ood ard and Butler, 1949-1954, 
Vol. 7, pp. 539-541)ol. 7, pp. 539-541) 
On the basis of all these considerations, therefore, we believe   
that the concessions and motive imagery scoring systems aree d ar  
conceptually distinct and that their empirical relationship is not   not 
simply an artifact of shared method variance (i.e., content overlap t  L "   
of the two systems).    
Sequential Pattern of Concessions in Crises 
The Munich and Poland crises showed interesting differences in
 es  
the sequential pattern of positive and negative concessions cate­
hardly representative sample of all 
   
gories, although they are  a    al  
crises. (The two Cuban-related crises were too brief to permit any f  a  
sequential analysis.) During the peacefully resolved Munich crisis,lly  
procedural categories scored very high in the middle and toward      
the end, preceded in both cases by mention of mediation. Most of    of 
the de-escalation responses occurred only at the end. In the Polandt  l ti    l  t t  .  t  l  
crisis, which escalated to war, procedural responses were lowerrisis, i  s l t  t  r, r r l r s s s r  l r 
overall but distributed through the early and middle stages of ther ll t istri t  t r  t  rl   i l  st s f t  
crisis. De-escalation responses occurred only during the middlecrisis. e-escalati  res ses cc rre  l  ri  the i le 
stages, whereas escalation as high both at the beginning and end ofstages, hereas escalation as high both at the beginning and end of 
the crisis. Further archival and experimental studies could deter­the crisis. Further archival and experi ental studies could deter­
mine whether these contrasting patterns were typical of peacefullyine whether these contrasting patterns were typical of peacefully 
resolved and escalating crises.resolved and escalating crises. 
Study 2: Experimental Study of the Antecedents  and 
 
Associatedt  Behaviors of Concessions
 
In the second study, we designed  laboratory experiment to  a   t  
explore the situational antecedents of concessions, as well as the      the 
relationship of concessions that are made in verbal exchanges to   t  
other important associated behaviors, such as  people's'  policy    
choices and their implicit images about the negotiation process.i   t i  i li it i  t t  ti ti  . 
The experimental procedure recapitulated, in a laboratory setting, ri t l r r  r it l t , i   l r t r  s tti , 
some of  thet  important Missile Crisis. of the Cuban i il  i i .i t t elementsl t   t   
Participants were first given different forms of  letter from Sovietti i t   i t i  i rent   a l tt   i t 
Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev to U.S. President John F. Kennedy. lcit .   .S. resi J  . ennedy. 
After reading Khrushchev's letter, participants were asked to pre­r '   pre­
pare a draft response for Kennedy's signature. These responsest r Kennedy's signature. These responses 
were scored for concessions and for power and affiliation motiva­   affi otiva­
tion. Then, participants were asked to evaluate specific options fori   
United States action and to respond to several questions.    
By varying certain features of the Khrushchev letter, it was
   as 
possible to determine the antecedents of (a) the level of couces­
       n
sions in participants' responses, (b) the motive imagery levels in i  
participants' responses, and (c) the aggressiveness of their action 
choices. 
Method 
Participants. Participants consisted of 118 students (61 women, 56  5  
men, and 1 who did not report gender) who were enrolled in an introduc­I 
tory psychology class at the University of Michigan. They participated tot the niversit  of Michigan. They participated to 
fulfill  course research participation requirement. Participants were testedll a  
30 people by author. Average agein small groups of 20  to   thee firstfirst ag  
was 18.71 years  = 0.88). Fifty percent were first-year students, 35%    (SD 
 
were sophomores,, and 15%  were more advanced students.t t .
d  Sixty-four	 i t  
percent were Caucasian, 11  Asian American, 8% African American, andt  i , II % i  i ,  i  i ,  
17% "other" or not indicated. " t r" r t i i t . 
The basic procedure used in Study  was adapted fromProcedure.   2  a 
study by Peterson et al. (1994, Study 1). Participants were instructed as t  I). a  
follows: 
In this experiment, you are  asked to read  brief summary of an first  a f   
Cuban	  1962—international crisis-theisis—t  Missile Crisis of October 62­
along with some historical materials from that crisis. After reading  
this material, you will be asked to write  response on the notepaper a  
[provided]. .  . . After you have finished writing your response, please) ..   
complete the additional questionnaires.l t  t  iti l ti i . 
Participants were then given a one-page "Historical Background to the  the 
Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962." Then, they read an abbreviated  
version of the letter written by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to U.S. t  l tt  ritt   i  r i i it  r  t  . . 
President John F. Kennedy on October 26, at the climax of the crisis. In   this 
letter, Khrushchev reviewed the actions and perceptions of each side and 
then cautioned the following:t  ti  t  ll i : 
Mr. President, you and I should not now pull on the ends of the rope   
in which you have tied  knot of war, because the harder you and a  II 
pull, the tighter this knot will become. And  time may come when a  
knot is tied so tight that the person who tied it is no longer capablethis   
of untying it, and then the knot will have to be cut. What that would  
mean  need not explain to you, because you yourself understand I  t explain to you, because you yourself understand 
perfectly what dread forces our two countries possess.tl  t    t  t i  . 
Calling on each side to show "statesmanlike wisdom," Khrushchev pro­  
posed the compromise that became the basis for the ultimate settlement of  
the crisis (The complete original letter is reproduced in U.S. Department of .   
State, 1973; the basic version used in the present study is from Peterson et;  
al., 1994, pp. 742-744.)!   
After reading the letter, participants were asked to perform the following   
task: 
Imagine that you are really in the middle of  major historical crisis. a   
Please imagine that you are an advisor to President Kennedy. The   
letter you have read has just come in and the President has asked you  
to draft	  reply to send to Khrushchev.t a  
Participants were given a sheet of lined paper, headed "The White House,"  
with the date of October 27, 1962, and an inside address to "Chairman    
Nikita S. Khrushchev, The Kremlin, Moscow, U.S.S.R." entered at the top  
and "John F. Kennedy, President of the United States" at the bottom.. ri  t e  
Participants were allowed about 20 min to write their responses.ti i t   ll  t  i  t  it  t i  . 
After finishing their draft response letters, participants were asked to t t  
indicate their preferred policies for dealing with the crisis by indicating r   
their agreement (on  9-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 a  I (strongly(strongly dodo notnot 
to  with the following seven possible U.S. actionsfavor)   9 (strongly favor),, .  
(taken from Peterson et al., 1994):t I   
I.	 Ignore Khrushchev; bomb the missile bases and launch a full-scale1. f ll  
U.S. invasion to remove all offensive weapons and overthrow the i   
Castro regime.t  i . 
2. Ignore Khrushchev, and bomb the missile bases.	  
3. Ignore Khrushchev, and tighten the U.S. blockade to include oil..  
4. Ignore Khrushchev; leave the U.S. blockade as it is, and wait.	 .    
the U.S. as it but offer to with5.	 Leave e . blockade   is, t, r  negotiate  
Khrushchev on the basis of his proposals.is r osals. 
Call off the blockade, and offer to negotiate with Khrushchev on6. 	 Ca l  r  
the basis of his proposals. 
7.  Accept his proposals as they stand, and call off the blockade.  t e l ckade. 
Two summary scores were calculated from the overall pattern of partici­
pants' policy choices. Because thee seven items, arranged in the above  e 
order, form an approximate Thurstone scale,, 5 it was possible to calculate  
an "overall peacefulness of policy choices" score by multiplying ratings of   
the seven responses by - 3  , - 2  , - 1 , 0  , 1,2, and 3, respectively, and then,  ,   
calculating the mean (Thurstone  Chave, 1929, p. 64). However, from &  .   
both theoretical and practical points of view, another important summaryt  t ti l  ti l i t   i , t  i t t  
measure is participants' average endorsement of Policy Choices 5, 6, and 7, i  ti i t '  t  li  i  , ,  , 
all of which involve negotiation and, thus, de-escalation. This is describedll f i  i l  ti ti  , t s, - s l ti . is is s ri  
as the "average endorsement of negotiation choices." as	 the "average endorse ent f negotiation choices." 
Using semantic differential methods (Osgood, Suci, Tannenbaum,ti l  &  
1957), participants then rated the following  concepts on 13 seven-point five   
bipolar adjective scales: NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV, JOHN F. KENNEDY, YOUR U( . 
REPLY TO KHRUSHCHEV'S LETTER, AN IDEAL LEADER, and  COMPROMISE.I . 6 
According to semantic differential theory, these adjectiveti l scales yield  
scores for the three major dimensions of connotative meaning: evaluation  t  t  j  i i   t ti  i : l ti  
(good-bad), potency (strong-weak), and activity (active-passive). Finally,, t  t ,  ti it  ti i . i ll , 
participants were asked their gender, ethnicity, year in college, and (onrti i t  r   t ir r, t i it , r i  ll ,   
9-point scales) "How interested in international relations are you?" (an­- i t s l s) "  i t r st  i  i t r ti l r l ti s r  " ( ­
choring points of 1  disinterested] to  interested])choring points f I [extremely[extre ely disinterested) to 99 [extremely[extre ely interested) 
and "Before  experiment, how familiar were you with the Cubanand " efore thisthis experi ent, ho  fa iliar ere you ith the uban 
Missile Crisis?" (anchoring points of  unfamiliar] toissile risis?" (anchoring points of 11 [extremely[extre ely unfa iliar) to 99 [ex­[ex­
familiar]). The experimenter also noted the time of day of eachtremelytre ely fa iliarD. The experi enter also noted the ti e of day of each 
experimental session.experimental session. 
The abbreviated Khrushchev letter hadKhrushchev letter versions.. he ab reviated Khrushchev letter had 
been previously been coded for power and affiliation motivation by anr ti n  an 
expert scorer, according to Winter's (1991) manual (see Peterson et al., t !  
1994). For the present study, four different versions of this abbreviatedP t  
letter were created, involving different combinations of motivation andt  
concession. Appendix  presents these four variations of the Khrushchevi . i  B t  t   i ti   t e hrus c  
letter. In two versions of the letter (the power motivation conditions), alll tt . I  t  i   t  l tt  t   ti ti  iti , ll 9 
sentences with affiliation imagery were removed and all 14 sentences withs t s it  ffili ti  i r  r  r   ll  s t s it  
powerr motive imageryti  werer  retained. In theI  othert r versionsi r t e two rsi s (the(thr t i . t o 
affiliation motivation conditions), the 14 power images were removed andaffiliation otivation conditions), the 14 po er i ages ere re oved and 
the  affiliation images retained. These two motivation conditions werethe 99 affiliation i ages retained. hese t o otivation conditions ere 
crossed by two concession conditions. In the "explicit concession" condi­crossed by t o concession conditions. In the "explicit concession" condi­
tions, Khrushchev's compromise offer was explicitly quoted, as follows:tions, hrushchev's co pro ise offer as explicitly quoted, as follo s: 
We, for our part, will declare that our ships bound for CubaI propose: ,  
are nott carrying any armaments.armaments.ca rying any You will declare that the UnitedYou wi l declare that the United 
States will not invade Cuba with its troops and will not support any 
other forces which might intend to invade Cuba. 
(In terms of the concessions scoring system introduced in this article, this   
passage would be scored for positive concession Category 3, "De-escala­ 
That is, the correlations of each item with adjacent items are positive55
 ,   eac  ite  ith a j ite s are positive 
and higher than the correlations with all other items. 
6 The following 7-point adjective scales were used, in this order: strong­
weak, peaceful-ferocious, fast-slow, bad-good, small-large, static­
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r i us,  
dynamic, cruel-kind, sharp-dull, unpleasant-pleasant, unfair-fair, dis­disir, 
honest-honest, brave-cowardly, passive-active, and gentle-violent. 
 Table 5 
Correlations of  Concessions Measures Witht  Policy Choices 
Agreement with policy choice 
Escalation responses 
Bomb missile bases and invade Cuba
  
Bomb missile bases 
Tighten blockade to include oil  
Neutral response 
Keep blockade and wait
  
Negotiation responses 
Keep blockade and offer to negotiate
 r   
End blockade and offer to negotiate
 r   
End blockade and accept Khrushchev's offer
  
Summary measures 
Overall peacefulness of policy choices
  
Average endorsement of negotiation choices
  
tp<.IO. *p<.05. **p<.OI. ***p<.OOI.1 0  /»< .01  />< .001  
tion: Reciprocal"). In contrast, the no-concession conditions omitted    this 
passage, which left the excerpt of Khrushchev's letter containing only   
threats, warnings, and  nonspecific call for "statesmanlike wisdom." Some a    
of these versions might seem incongruous: for example,  letter with many   a  
power images that offered concession, or a letter full of affiliationaffil a  
imagery without an explicit concession. However, we believe that each ofi  it t  li it i . ,  li  t t  f 
the four versions was plausible as  single, free-standing communication.t  f r rsi s s l si l  s a si l , fr -st i  i ti . 
(Readers can form their own judgment on this point by consulting Appen­( rs  f r  t ir  j t  t is i t  s lti  ­
dix B.)dix .) 
The four different versions of the abbreviated Khrushchev letter weret   
randomly mixed together by stacking the versions in random order, thus     
creating  2 factorial design for analyzing the effects  t of the motive a 2 x
imagery (affiliation vs. power) and concession (explicit concession vs. noi ti n .  co cessi  (e li it co cessi  vs.  
in Khrushchev's letter on several variables: (a) the concessionsconcession)   
and motive imagery in the responses participants drafted for the president,    
(b) participants' policy choices, and (c) participants' implicit images of'  ) ' f 
various aspects of the negotiation process. All four conditions (i.e.,i  t   t  ti ti  . ll  iti  i. ., 
Khrushchev letter versions) thus occurredl tt r rsi s) t s rr in each of the experimentalr s  i   f t  ri t l 
sessions.sessions. 
All response letters were scored for motive 
imagery by an expert scorer, who hado  previously demonstrated high 
Scoring of  response letters.. 
 
reliability (category agreement a2 .85) on materials precoded by expert)     
scorers. Concessions were scored by the first author, who was blind to the  the 
experimental condition and all other information about the participants and  
their responses. Motive scores were expressed in the usual way, as images    
per 1,000 words. The brevity of the response letters (range = 27-229 ,  .  it   t   l tt   
 
words,, Mdn = 129 words), however, meant that most concession catego­
 , , t t t t i  t
ries were scored only once if at all. (Ninety eight percent of all positiveri s r  s r  l   if t ll. ( i t  i t r t f ll siti  
concessions scoress r s and 93% of all negative concessionsti  ssi s scores weressi s  f ll s r s r  
either  or 1.) Adjusting raw scores for length, as was done with the mucheither 00 or I.) djusting ra  scores for length, as as done ith the uch 
longer diplomatic documents used in Study 1, would actually introducel r i l ti  ts s  i  t  I, l  t ll  i tr  
substantial distortion. For purposes of the present study, the importants st ti l ist rti . r r s s f t  r s t st , t  i rt t 
point was whether, in response to different versions of the Khrushchevi t s t r, i  r s s  t  iff r t rsi s f t  r s  
letter, the letters contained any concession; therefore, concession scoresl tt r, t  l tt rs t i   ssi ; t r f r , ssi  s r s 
werer  not adjusted for lengtht j st  f r l t off response.r s s . The Pearson correlations with77  rs  rr l ti s it  
theset s  measures,s r s, therefore, approach the point-biserial correlations thatt r f r , r  t  i t- is ri l rr l ti s t t 
would be obtained by using the collapsed presence/absence scores.l   t i   si  t  ll s  r s / s  s r s. 
Plan of  analysis and hypotheses. Study 2 was designed to explore, ins   
an experimental setting, the antecedents and associated consequences of
  f 
making concessions (i.e., of the concessions scores in participants' letters).
  
We were interested in three basic questions: (a) Would the relationships,
 )   
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observed in the archival study, between affiliation motivation and positive ti n  
concessions, and power motivation and negative concessions, replicate at p r oti ti  and negati e concessions, re licate t 
the individual level? To answer  question, we correlated the motive  this    
scores and the concessions scores in participants' response letters, (b) What.  
variables in the negotiation process might induce concessions? We hypoth­i l  i  t  ti ti   i t i  i   t
esized that the presence of an explicit (positive) concession in Khrush­i  t t t     li it iti  i  i  
chev's letter would causes  participants to withit  explicitrti i ts t  reciprocate an  li it's l tt r l  r i r t  
positive concession in their response.  we expected that the affil­positive concession in their response. Further,urther, e expected that the affil­
iation motivation version of the Khrushchev letter would be more likely toiation otivation version of the hrushchev letter ould .be ore likely to 
elicit concessions in participants' responses, (c) Finally, we were interestedelicit concessions in participants' responses. (c) Finally, e ere interested 
in exploring the relationship among both concessions and motivation inin exploring the relationship among both concessions and motivation in 
participants' response letters and their explicit policy choices, as well as theparticipants' response letters and their explicit policy choices, as well as the 
connotative meanings reflected in their images of the major actors in theconnotative meanings reflected in their images of the major actors in the 
crisis (Kennedy, Khrushchev), the concept of ideal leader, their owncrisis (Kennedy, Khrushchev), the concept of ideal leader, their own 
responses, and the concept of concessions.responses, and the concept of concessions. 
Resultslts 
Validation off the concessions measures. The first task was to 
extend the validity of the concessions measures, established by the   
archival research of Study 1, to the present experimental study. In   
other words, did those people who wrote responses to Khrushchevt  , i  t  l   t   t   
that scored higher in concessions also choose less aggressivet t r  i r i  i  l   l  r i  
policies? Table  presents the relationships between positive andlicies? a le 5 rese ts t e relati s i s et ee  siti e a  
negative concessions and endorsements of different policy options.negative concessions and endorse ents of different policy options. 
In general, people scoring high in positive concessions and netIn general, people scoring high in positive concessions and net 
concessions tended to endorse specific policy choices that in­concessions tended to endorse specific policy choices that in­
volved negotiation rather than escalation and score higher on bothvolved negotiation rather than escalation and score higher on both 
the "overall peaceable" and the negotiation summary scores. Peo­the "overall peaceable" and the negotiation su ary scores. Peo­
ple scoring high in negative concessions, in contrast, tended tople scoring high in negative concessions, in contrast, tended to 
endorse at least moderate escalation (tightening the blockade toendorse at least oderate escalation (tightening the blockade to 
include oil, higher overall aggressiveness of policy choices) ratherinclude oil, higher overall aggressiveness of policy choices) rather 
than any kind of negotiation. Thus the content of students' open­than any kind of negotiation. Thus the content of students' open­
7
 Collapsing the positive and negative concessions scores to simple 
presence-absence measures produced essentially the same results. For ease 
7  OSiti    
 
of presentation, however, we present the results using continuous scores.
    
Table 6le 
Descriptives ri ti  Statisticst ti ti s From Experimentalri e t l Studyt  offConcessionsi  
Experimental conditionri e t l iti  
Affiliation, explicit 
concession (ni  (  =  30) 
ffiliation, li it 
) 
Affiliation, no concessions 
(«(n =  30) 
ffili ti n,   
) 
Power, explicit concessionsr, li it i  
(n(  =  28)) 
Power, no concessions,   
(n(  = 30) ) 
All conditions combined 
(N(  =  117)) 
 i   
Response to Khrushchev letters  t r  l tt r 
Positive Negative Affiliation Poweriti  ti  Nett ffiliation r 
concessions concessions concessions motivation motivationi  i  i  ti ti  ti ti  
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
0.47.  0.51.  0.30.  0.47.  0.17.  0.75.  7.23.  8.00. 0 14.61 9.23.  1.40.40 18.83.  4.42.  1.56.  
0.28.  0.45.  0.38.  0.47.  -0.10.  0.77.  6.75  8.86.  14.10 10.00  1.14. 4 16.26.  3.99.  1.57.  
0.54.  0.64.  0.46.  0.64.  0.07.  0.94.  2.50.  5.81 22.35 18.98 6.07.  16.09.  4.91.  1.37.  
0.23 0.43  0.60.  0.77.  -0.37.  0.96.  2.85 4.81 22.01 12.13 -0.13  16.63 4.21.  1.52.  
0.38 0.52  0.44  0.62  -0.06  0.87 4.85 7.30  18.24 13.47 2.06.  16.95.  4.38.  1.53.  
related to their actual policyended negotiation tIO  responses was    
choices. 
In participants' response letters, mo­Motives and  concessions. 
tive imagery scores were related to concessions in the same ways
   
as in Study I: Affiliation motive imagery was positively related to 
positive concessions (r = .22,  = .05) and negatively 
 1: i tion 
 N 118, pP < 
related to negative concessions (r  = —.28,  .01), whereas-.28, p <  
power motive imagery was negatively related to positive conces­  
—.16, p .10) and positively related to negativesions (r = - .1 , P <  
concessions (r = .37,  .001).8 p < ).8 
Effects off experimental conditions on concessions and motiva­
tion expressed in participants't ' responses.ses. preliminary analysisA  
showed no pattern of significant relationships among the depen­
  t 
dent variables and the demographic variables (ethnicity, year in 
college), interest in international relations, or previous knowledge 
of the Cuban Missile 9 (The effects of gender will be Crisis.i .9 
discussed below.) Table 6, therefore, presents descriptive statistics 
on the major variables of Study  for each of the four separate      2       
experimental conditions defined by the four versions of the         
Khrushchev letter as well as for the entire combined sample.r  l tt r  ll  f r t  tir  i  l . 
The effects of the experimental conditions were tested with  
three-way analyses of variance for the dependent variables based 
on participants' responses to Khrushchev and their policy choices,
  
with the Khrushchev letter experimental conditions (variables of  
explicit concession and affiliation versus power motivation) andi   
participants' gender as  main effects. Whether the Khrushchev'   r  
letter contained an  explicit concession had main effect onl   a   
whether participants in their response offered  positive conces­i   a 
sion, F(l, 109) = 7.17,. , Pp .009, and offered more net conces­i , ,  = . ,   
4.25, P .042, though it was unrelated tosions,i , F(l,, 109)  = . , p = . ,  i     
participants' negative concessions. Theti i t ' ti  i s. same reciprocal patterni l tt  
was observed for the motive imagery content of the Khrushchevs r  f r t  ti  i r  t t  t  r s  
letter. Participants receiving the affiliation version responded withl tt r. rti i ts r i i  t  ffili ti  rsi  r s  it  
higher affiliation, F(l, 109) = 12.24,. , p < .001, and lower power,. 01,  l r r,i r ffili ti , (l, ) 
 
F((l,I, 109)) = 10.54, p = .002, than did those receiving the power. , t a  i  t se recei i  t e er
10.54, P 
version. (That power was greater than affiliation in all conditionsrsi . ( t r s r t r t  ffili ti  i  ll c iti s 
was probably due to the "pulling power" or motive-arousal effectsas r l   t  t  " lli  r" r ti - r s l effects 
of the experimental situation.) There was a near-significant trend t  e ri t l sit ti .) r  as a r- i ifi t tr  
for the Khrushchev letter version that offered an explicit conces­f r t e r  l tt r r i  t t ff r  a  e li it ces­
sion to elicit a higher average endorsement of negotiation choices,si  t  eli it a i r a r  e r t  ti ti  ices, 
Summary policy choicesar  li  i  
Overallerall Negotiatione ti ti  
peacefulnessef lness choicesi  
M SD M SD 
F(l, 109)  3.08,  .082. There were no significant interactions,  =  . , p = . .    ificant  
of the two Khrushchev letter experimental conditions (Motivationf     t l   
Condition X Concession Condition).i   i  . 
Gender showed only three significant or near-significant main i t  ificant  
effects: For  positive concessions, women  were higher, F(l,   
109) =  3.76,. , p =  .055; for peacefulness of policy choices, women.   l ss   ,  
scored higher, F(l, 109) = 2.97, p  .087; and for negotiation , I   . , P = .     
policy choices, women scored higher, F(l, 109) ,   , ,  = 4.72,  = .032.. .. , p 
These effects ff t arer consistent with other evidence showing that,i t t it  t r i  i  t t, 
under some circumstances at least, women tend to show lowerr  ir t  t l t,  t  t   l r 
levels of certain kinds of aggressive behaviors than do men (Geen,l ls f rt i  i s f r ssi  i rs t    ( , 
1998, pp. 330-332). There were no gender differences in either, . - ). r  r   r iff r s i  it r 
motive imagery score. There was one significant two-way inter­ti  i r  s r . r  s  si ifi t t -  i t r­
action involving gender:acti  i l i  e er: womene responded with higher powerres e  it  i er er 
motive imagery (thoughti e i a er  (t  not more aggressive responses) whennot re aggressive responses) hen 
Khrushchev's letter included an explicit concession, whereas menhrushchev's letter included an explicit concession, hereas en 
showed the opposite pattern, F(l, 109) = .006. Perhapssho ed the opposite pattern, F(l, 109) = = 8.00,8.00, pp .006. Perhaps 
inin aa  (until recently, at least, asimulated international conflict least, asi ulated international conflict (until recently, at 
stereotypically male situation), these women felt pressure to em­stereotypically ale situation), these o en felt pressure to e ­
bellish their response to a "dove" (Khrushchev's concession) withbellish their response to a "dove" ( hrushchev's concession) ith 
their own imagery of the "hawk" (power motive). Finally, theretheir own i agery of the "hawk" (power otive). Finally, there 
was one near-significant three-way interaction: Inspection ofwas one near-significant three-way interaction: Inspection of 
means showed that in the two mildly incongruous conditionseans showed that in the two ildly incongruous conditions 
(Khrushchev's letter if either high affiliation with no concessions(Khrushchev's letter if either high affiliation with no concessions 
or high power with concessions), women had higher averageor high power with concessions), women had higher average 
endorsement of negotiation choices than did men, F( l ,endorsement of negotiation choices than did men, F( 1, 
109) = 3.71, p = .057. Perhaps in such situations of mild incon­109) = 3.71, p = .057. Perhaps in such situations of mild incon­
gruity between cues about the intentions of the other side, womengruity between cues about the intentions of the other side, women 
8
 The discussion of possible method overlap between the concessions8 e isc ssi   ssi le t  erlap t  the concessions 
and motive imagery methods, in connection with Study 1, applies ti  i  t s, i  i  it  t I, li s tot  
Study  as well.t  2 s ll. 
9
 Time of day was related to policy choices, with afternoon participants9 i e a  as r l te  to li  ices, it  ft r participants 
making more aggressive choices than morning participants. It is not pos­i  r  r i  i s t  i  ti i a ts. It is t s­
sible to determine whether this reflects  true effect of time or differencesi l  t  t r i  t  t is r l  a tr e   ti e r dif erences 
among participants who signed up for different times. Because time of daya  rtici a ts o si e  p f r iff r t ti es. se ti e f a  
was not significantly related to either of the experimental conditions, theas t si ifi tl  r late  to eit r f the e ri t l c itions, the 
concessions orr motive scoressc res in participants' responses,responses, or anya y otherc ssi s ti e in rtici a ts' r t er 
demographic variable, this effect was ignored in subsequent analyses.de ographic variable, this effect as ignored in subsequent analyses. 
Khrushchev 
letter 
version 
Participants'Participants' response letter  
policy choices 
Affiliation 
(vs. power) . 
.23"** Affiliation 
motive ^ 2 0  *.20* Positive 
motive imagery imagery concessions 
.18* 
V.22*-.22  I 
Average 
\ -.28"8** endorsement of  
-.25*'* 
) negotiation 
choices 
i f \ 
-.24* 
Explicit 
concession 
offered 
Power 
motive 
imagery .30"** 
Negative 
concessions 
Post hoc path analysis of variables from Study 2. *  .05. **  .01.Figure 1.. . p <   p < . 
tend to respond to whichever cue (explicit concession or affiliationaffil  
motive imagery) suggests de-escalation. 
Interrelationships of experimental conditions, participants'i ts' re­r
As  way of drawing together thesponses,, and policy  choices.. s a t  
different results of Study 2, Figure 1 presents the results oft , I e  a 
descriptive path analysis showing all significant relationships be­l t 
tween experimental condition and response variables to the aver­t  i t l iti    i l  t  t  
age endorsement of negotiation choices (i.e., the average endorse­ t  ti ti  i  L ., t   
ment of the three policy choices involving negotiation). The causalt f t  t r  li  i  i l i  ti ti ).  l 
ordering reflected in this figure assumes that the two experimentalr eri  reflecte  i  t is fi re ass es t at t e t  e eri e tal 
conditions involving the Khrushchev letter precede the character­c iti s i l i  t e r s c e  letter rece e t e c aracter­
istics of the participants' response letter and that, within the letter,istics of the participants' response letter and that, ithin the letter, 
motives precede concessions. These assumptions are certainlyotives precede concessions. hese assu ptions are certainly 
debatable; however, the intention of the figure is to give  coherentdebatable; ho ever, the intention of the figure is to give aa coherent 
overall description of our results rather than to test  single specificoverall description of our results rather than to test aa single specific 
causal model. Obviously this is a post hoc model that needs furthercausal odel. bviously this is a post hoc odel that needs further 
testing in future replications. As suggested by the figure, thetesting in future replications. s suggested by the figure, the 
explicit concession-related content of a received communicationexplicit concession-related content of a received co unication 
directly affects the tendency to offer explicit concessions in re­directly affects the tendency to offer explicit concessions in re­
sponse. The motive imagery of the received communication di­sponse. The motive imagery of the received communication di­
rectly affects the motive imagery of the response; the responserectly affects the motive imagery of the response; the response 
motive imagery, in turn, affects explicit concessions offered in themotive imagery, in turn, affects explicit concessions offered in the 
response. This suggests, as a potential general principle, that theresponse. This suggests, as a potential general principle, that the 
motive imagery of communications—involving affective tonemotive imagery of communications-involving affective tone 
more than explicit content—has effects on concessions that aremore than explicit content-has effects on concessions that are 
indirect or mediated by the arousal of motive imagery ofindirect or mediated by the arousal of motive imagery of 
10responses.responses. 10 
Making concessions and thee image of compromise. The se­e se­
mantic differentialti l measures connotative meanings along three 
dimensions of evaluation,  and activity. In Study 2, the potency,   , the 
major significant results involved participants' evaluation and po­
 t 
tency ratings of COMPROMISE and YOUR REPLY TO KHRUSHCHEV'S
   
LETTER. As shown in Table 7, participants who made positive. s  , ICI o OSIti  
concessions tended to view their own response as higher in eval­   
uation and lower in potency, whereas participants who made  o  
negative concessions showed the reverse pattern. Interestingly  
enough, people's tendency to make concessions  not related to, l '  t  t   i  was t l t  t  
the perceived potency of concession making itself. Gendert  r i  t  f i  i  it lf. r was 
related to participants' images of compromise and their own re­relate  t  artici a ts' i a es f c r ise a  their o n re­
Women tended to view COMPROMISE as both better andsponses.s ses. e  te e  t  ie  P IS  as t  etter a  
stronger while rating their own responses as weaker. (Recall thatstronger hile rating their o n responses as eaker. ( ecall that 
women made more positive concessions than did men.)o en ade ore positive concessions than did en.) 
Summary of  experimental results.. The explicit offering ofi   a 
concession or lack thereof by the Khrushchev letter had  recip­ f   a 
rocal effect on  participants offered  positive concessiont  whether  a  
in response. The motive imagery in the Khrushchev letter also had 
reciprocal effect on motive imagery levels in participants' re­a t   r
sponses: The affiliation version elicited higher affiliation ande ti n ti  an  
lower power than did the power version. In other words, received  
concessions primed concessions offered in response, and receivedi  i  i   i  ,  i  
motive imagery primed response motive imagery. In this experi­ti  i r  ri  r  ti  i r . I  t i  ri­
ment, there were no significant cross-primes; that is, concessionst, t r  r   i ifi t r - ri ; t t i , i  
did not directly prime motive imagery, or vice versa.i  t ir tl  ri  ti  i r , r i  rs . 
The motive imagery results of Study  replicate the archival 2 e  
findings of the archival Study I reported previously. Making
 1  
positive concessions is positively related to affiliation motivation
  ti   
and negatively related to power motivation, whereas making neg­
ative concessions shows the reverse pattern. The pattern of con­
 
10
 The concept of motive, as used in  research, includes features of10   this f 
dispositional stability and situational arousability, as discussed by Winter    
(1996, pp. 33-34). 
Table 7 
Correlations off Concessions Measures With 
Images of  Concession 
Correlation with 
Female 
Semantic differential variable concessions concessions gender 
Positive Negative 
.09 - .20* .20* 
COMPROMISE-potencyPROMISE—  .00 -.02 .34*** 
COMPROMIsE-evaluationPROMISE—evalu ti    
YOUR RESPONSE TO KHRUSHCHEV'S  
LETTER—evaluation .30*** -.17t - . 0  9R-eval
-. t  
YOUR RESPONSE TO KHRUSHCHEV'S  
LETTER—potencyER-pot  - .20* .23* - . 2 5 *  *  
t p < . 1 0 . * p < . 0 5 . < .05. p  .01. *** p < .001. p < .10. ** P < . * * / > < . . 
cession making in participants' response letters was related to their 
endorsement of policy choices involving negotiation.   
One might wonder whether students' knowledge of how the  
Cuban Missile Crisis actually ended (presuming that they actually 
knew) could somehow bias their responses and thus affect thet  
results. This is an unavoidable problem for experiments that use 
actual crises rather than laboratory simulations (except on raret l i  t  t  l t  i l ti  t   
occasions such as thet  fallll of 1990, when the Gulf Crisis wasi    ,  t  lf i i  
ongoing and the ultimate result was unknown), but it is difficult toi   t  lti t  r lt  ), t it i  iffi lt t  
determine the effects of such knowledge. On the one hand, onet r i  t  ff t  f  l .  t   ,  
could argue that knowing the crisis ended peacefully would makec l  ar e t at i  t e crisis e e  eacef ll  l  a e 
participants more reckless in their responses; on the other hand, theparticipants ore reckless in their responses; on the other hand, the 
fact that the Cold War had long since ended might make themfact that the old ar had long since ended ight ake the  
more conciliatory. In any case, however, any general effect forore conciliatory. In any case, ho ever, any general effect for 
participants to imitate Kennedy's decisions and actions in 1962participants to i itate ennedy's decisions and actions in 1962 
should tend to wipe out, rather than create, the effects observedshould tend to wipe out, rather than create, the effects observed 
here. Finally, as discussed above, we found that students' self-here. Finally, as discussed above, we found that students' self­
reported knowledge of the crisis was unrelated to any of theirreported knowledge of the crisis was unrelated to any of their 
responses.responses. 
Discussion 
Main Findings 
two studies extend our 
knowledge of how conflicts may be resolved through compromise, 
Taken together, the results of these  
   
because they illuminate some important motivational and situa­
tional dynamics of making (or rejecting) concessions. Both in  
archival and laboratory settings, the affiliation motive is associatedtion  
with positive concessions; power motivation, in contrast, predictsit  iti  i ;  ti ti , i  t t, i t  
negative concessions or rejecting concessions offered by the otherti  i  r r j ti  i  ff r d  t  t r 
side. In the laboratory study, the concession-related content ofi . I  t  l r t r  t , t  i -r l t  t t f a 
message elicited or primed concessions in response, and the mo­essa e elicite  r ri e  c cessi s i  res se, a  t e ­
tivational tone of the message primed motive imagery in response.ti ati al t e f t e essa e ri e  ti e i a er  i  res se. 
Response motive imagery, in turn, was related to offering conces­es se ti e i a er , i  t r , as relate  t  fferi  c ces­
sions and to endorsing policy choices involving negotiation. Thesesions and to endorsing policy choices involving negotiation. hese 
are important effects, because in both archival and experimentalare i portant effects, because in both archival and experi ental 
studies, concessions (and their associated motive imagery) havestudies, concessions (and their associated otive i agery) have 
been shown to be related to policy and ultimate outcomes of warbeen sho n to be related to policy and ulti ate outco es of ar 
versus peace. Thus the present studies increase the precision ofers s eace. s t e rese t st ies i crease t e recisi  f 
terms cooperative and competitive negotiating orienta­ter s suchs c asas c erati e a  c etiti e e tiati  rie ta­
tions, which have been used to describe individual state and traitti s, ic  a e ee  se  t  escri e i i i al state a  trait 
differences in negotiation style.iffere ces i  e tiati  st le. 
These findings are consistent with previous studies of interna­ 
tional negotiations relating concessions to rhetoric (Beriker &
Druckman,  Druckman, 1986; Druckman Harris, 1990; 1991;;  &  
Stoll  MeAndrew, 1986) and demonstrating matching (or "tit­ & c
for-tat") effects during the course of negotiation (Carnevale &t   
Pruitt, 1992). 
System forr Scoring Concessions 
the studies provided both archival andTaken together, two  
experimental validation for the system for scoring and measuring 
concessions. Because the positive and negative concessions mea­
sures showed the predicted relationship to crisis outcome (archival 
study) and policy choices (experimental study), they can be seen as 
reflecting critical elements of compromise (or escalation) the  
process.r . 
Psychological Model of  the Concession-Compromisec s i  
Process 
some aspects of general model of the 
compromise process. The tendencies to make positive concessions, 
Our results suggest
 
 a  
and not to make negative concessions, seem to be critical deter­
minants of whether conflictt will be peacefullyll  resolved or a    
escalate to war. The present research suggests that offering con­i  
cessions, in turn, is  function of three factors: (a) people's dispo­ a   '
sitional motive levels  their balance between power and affil­iti l ti  l l  (i.e.,i. ., t i  l  t    il
iation motivation), (b) the balance of power and affiliationi ti  ti ti ), ( ) t  l  f r  affili ti  
motivation in messages they receive during the negotiation processti ati  i  essa es t e  recei e ri  t e e tiati  r cess 
(which appear to act as motive-arousal experiences; see Winter,( ic  a ear t  act as ti e-ar sal e erie ces; see i ter, 
1998), and (c) whether explicit concessions are offered to them in1998), and (c) hether explicit concessions are offered to the  in 
messages they receive during negotiation.essages they receive during negotiation. 
Of course motives are only one of the psychological elements   
that contribute to productive negotiations that can turn crises from 
escalation to peacefull resolution. Other variables, such as the  
tendency to be hostile and punitive toward out-groups (reflected int   
authoritarianism and social dominance orientation), cognitive   
complexity, and the many individual and structural characteristicsl it ,  t   i i i l  t t l t i ti  
reviewed at the beginning of this article also play important rolesr i  t t  i i  f t i  rti l  l  l  i rt t r l  
in negotiation outcomes.i  e tiati  tc es. 
A Concluding Cautionary Note From History 
Concessions are often essential to successful negotiation and the l  
maintenance of peace; however, concessions and compromise may   
not always be strategically effective or even morally "good." Thus,i e  
most historians regard the British concessions and compromises 
embodied in the 1938 Munich agreements with Hitler—described r-descri  
by British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain as bringing "peace iti  i  i i t  ill  l i   i i   
with honour . .  . peace for our time" (1939, p. 200)—as  cowardlyit       ti  , . 0)-  a l  
and (ultimately) ineffective attempt to appease  brutal " lti t l  i ti e tt t t   a t l bully.lly. I I 
There may be occasions where concessions (especially if they arer    i  r  i  ( i ll  if t  r  
not reciprocated,t r i r t , or reciprocated only in superficial ways) arer r i r t  l  i  rfi i l ) r  
II" Some historians,i , however,r, have suggested that by postponing an 
inevitable war, the Munich agreements did give Britain more time to 
rebuild its armed forces, though it is doubtful that this was Chamberlain's 
intention in making them (see P. Kennedy, 1986).  
  
 
neither virtuous nor prudent. Psychological analysis can only be an 
aid to political wisdom, not a substitute for it. 
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Appendix A 
Government-to-Government Communications From Four Crisesr t  
Dale Document  Source 
Munich crisis (1938) 
5/22 Henderson letter to Ribbentrop  GD II: 320 : 
5/231  Henderson letter to Weizsacker GD II: 331:  
6/10/10 Henderson (Halifax) to Ribbentrop  GD II: 411  
7/1R8 Henderson to Weizsacker GD II: 490-491: -  
7/1X~ Cadogan to Captain Wiedemann BD I: 589-590   
7/201  Weizsacker to Henderson  GD II: 501-502: -  
7/211  Weizsacker to Halifax (message incorporated in document)    BD I: 609  
7/28  Halifax to Ribbentrop  BD II: 18-19  
7129/29 Henderson to Weizsacker  GD II: 525  
8/3 BD II: 41J Chamberlain to German ambassador      
8/7 German ambassador to Chamberlain  BD II: 60~17    
8/11 Halifax to Hitler via Henderson BD II: 78-80  :  
8/21 BD II: 127-129Ribbentrop to Halifax  ~  
9/9 Halifax to Ribbentrop BD II: 277-278 
9/13/13 Chamberlain to Hitler  BDII: 314 II:  
9/19 Chamberlain to Hitler  BD II: 406 :  
9/19 Weizsacker to Henderson  GD II: 839-840 II:  
9/19 Henderson to Weizsacker  GD II: 846-847 II:  
9/20'H  Chamberlain to Hitler (via Henderson)     BD II: 424 II:  
9/20  Ribbentrop to Hendersoni tr  t  rs  BD II: 430-431II:  
9/20/20 Henderson to Ribbentroprs  t  i tr  BD II: 431-432 II: *  
9/23 Chamberlain lo Hitlerha berlain to itler BD II: 482-483 II: ^  
Hitler to Chamberlain BD II:9/23/23 itler to ha berlain  II: 485-487 
Chamberlain to Hitler BD II: 488 
9/24 BD II: 495-496  
9/24124 ha berlain to iller  II: 
German memorandum to Chamberlain  II:er an e orandu  to ha berlain 
9/26 BD II: 541-542Chamberlain to Hitler  II:1 Cha berlain to itler 
9/26 GD II: 939Lord Rothermere to Ribbentrop GD II:/26 Lord Rother ere to Ribbentrop 
9/26 GD II: 940--941-Ribbentrop to Lord Rothermere GD II:/26 Ribbentrop to Lord Rother ere 
9/26 GD II: 943Statement by Chamberlain GD II: State ent by Cha berlain 
9/27 Hitler to Chamberlain BD II: 576-578Hitler to Chamberlain BD II: 

Henderson to Ribbentrop GD II: 

'
9/27/27 Henderson to Ribbentrop GD II: 986-988 (Enclosures I. & 2) 
9/28 BD II: 587 
 1- 2)
Chamberlain to Hitler BD II:Cha berlain to Hitler 
Polish crisis (1939) 
3/31  Chamberlain "informing" '"infor i  German government (via Henderson)  of his 3/31 statement  BD IV: 552-553 
4/27/27 Memorandum to British Foreign Office re: naval agreement e o  BD V: 360--362 -  
5/9 Henderson statement BD V: 478 (Paragraph 3)   
6/2323 Memorandum for transmittal to German Foreign   Office BD VI: 153-158 
8/23Z} Chamberlain to Hitler  BD VII: 170--172-  
8/24 BD VII: 177-179Hitler to Chamberlain  
8/25 Text of Hitler's verbal communication BD VII: 227-2291    
8/28 Text of British reply to Hitler   BD VII: 330-332--  
8/30  Text of Hitler's reply to British  BD VII: 388-390 
8/30  Halifax to Hitler via Henderson  BD VII: 403 
8/30  Text of British reply to Hitler, as modified   BD VII: 413-414, 417 
8/31 Weizsacker to Henderson  BD VII: 457-458  
8/31 German proposals re: Danzig  BD VII: 459-462  
9/1 Halifax  to German government BD VII: 488 
9/3J British ultimatum BD VII: 535 
9/3  German reply, via U.S. Berlin Embassy BD VII: 539-541 
Bay of Pigs (1961)
  
FBIS, 417161, pp. BBI6-17 
4/122 Kennedy News Conference (Cuba portions)e  PPP, pp. 258-265 
4/6  Yuri Lukyanov commentary on U.S. White Paper on Cuba .   / / 1
4/18 USSR statement about invasion  CDSP, pp. 3-4
4/18 Khrushchev message to Kennedy10  CDSP, pp. 4-5  
4/18 Kennedy message to Khrushchev PPP, p. 286, 2  
4/201  Kennedy speech to newspaper editors  PPP, pp. 304-306 
4/22 Khrushchev message to Kennedy CDSP, pp. 7-9 
Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)
  
DSB 
10123/  Soviet government statement (via Tass news agency)t t  New York Times 10/24/62, p. 20 
10/22 Kennedy crisis speech 
10/22 Kennedy to Khrushchev DSB
 
10/23 Khrushchev to Kennedy DSB
 

10/23 Kennedy to Khrushchev DSB
 
10/24 Khrushchev to Kennedy DSB
 
10/25 Kennedy to Khrushchev DSB
 
10/26 Khrushchev to Kennedy DSB
 
10/27 Khrushchev to Kennedy DSB
 
10/27 Kennedy to Khrushchev DSB
 
10128/  Khrushchev to Kennedy DSB
 

10/'28/  Kennedy to Khrushchev DSB
 

Notc. BD
 = = Current Digest off the Soviet Press,, 13(16); DSB =

translations); FBIS:  =  Broadcast  GD = U.S. Department of State (1949); PPP. t   = J. F. Kennedy (1961). 

e.  Woodward  and Butler (1949-1954); CDSP  U.S. Department of State. t   (1973, pp. 635-655, "official"" f  
 Foreign r""/Cll  Information Service Daily Report;   
CONCESSIONS, MOTIVES, AND CONFLICT ESCALATION
. .   
Appendix B
 
Template Letter From Khrushchev to Kennedy, October 26, 1962
 
[Text as received by the U.S. State Department from the U.S.S.R. Embassy]
 
  
.  
Dear Mr. President: 
By now we our assessments of the have already publicly exchanged r  e  
events around Cuba and each of us has set forth his explanation and his t hi  
understanding of these events. I think you will understand me correctly    
fAFF: if you are really concerned for the welfare of the world. Everyone[ P: i   r  r ll  f  t  l f t  rl . ver  
needs peace: both capitalists, if they have not lost their reason, and, all the. . .  
more, communists—people who know how to value not only their own. unists-   t  
lives but, above all else, the lives of nationsl. We communists are against. . ]  
any wars between states at all [AFF: and have been defending the cause ofl   f 
peace ever since we came into the world. We have always regarded war as r i    i t  t  rl .   l  r r  r  
calamity, not as a game or a means for achieving particular purposes,a l it . t s      f r i i  rti l r r . 
much less as a goal in itself. Our goals are clear, and the means of l ss s  l i  its lf. r ls re l r, d t e s of 
achieving them is work. War is our enemy and a calamity for all nations.i i  t  is r . r is r    l it  f r ll ti s. 
This is how we Soviet people. and together with us. other peoples as  , ,  
well, interpret questions of war and peace.  can say this with assurance at.   I a  
least for the peoples of the Socialist countries, as well as for all progressive .  
people who want peace, happiness, and friendship among nations.. .   
can see. Mr. President, that you also are  not devoid of  sense ofofI n , r. . u  t   a 
anxiety for the fate of the world, not without an understanding and correct .   
assessment of the nature of modern warfare and what war entails. What   
good would  war do you?1 fPOW: You threaten us with war. But you well a ] [  
know that the very least you would get in response would be what you had 
given us; you would suffer the same consequences.1 FAFF: That must ber .] [ F : b  
clear to us—people invested with authority, trust, and responsibility. Wel r t  -peo l  i t  it  t rit . tr t,  r i ilit .  
must not succumb to light-headedness and petty passions, regardless ofst t s  t  li t- ss d tt  ssi s. r r l ss of 
whether elections are forthcoming in one country or another. These are allt r l ti s r  f rt i  i   tr  r t r. s  r  ll 
transitory things.l fPOW: Should war indeed break out, it would not be intransitory things.] [ : hould ar indeed break out, it ould not be in 
our power to contain or stop it. for such is the logic of war. I have takenour po er to contain or stop it. for such is the logic of war. I have taken 
part in two wars, and  know that war only ends when it has rolled throughpart in t o ars. and II kno  that ar only ends hen it has rolled through 
cities and villages, sowing death and destruction everywhere.cities and villages. sowing death and destruction everywhere. 
You may regard us with distrust, but you can at any rate rest assured that we  
are of sound mind and understand perfectly well that if we launch an offensive  f  
against you, you will respond in kind. But you too will get in response. u   t u o t   
whatever you throw at us. And  think that you also understand that, too..  I .  
This indicates that] we are sane people, [POW: that] we understand and
  !  
assess the situation correctly. How could we, then, allow ourselves the wrong  
actions which you  ascribe to us?? Only lunatics or  suicides fPOW: whowh  [
themselves want to perish and to destroy the whole world before they die.l  ] 
could do this, fAFF: But we want to live and by no means do we want to this. [APP: But we want to live and by no means do we want to 
destroy our countrv.l We want something quite different: to compete with youry ]    
country FAFF: in  peaceful endeavor!. We argue with you; we have differ­[ PP:  a l ] i -
ences on ideological questions. But our concept of the world is that questions  i l i l ti . t r t f t  rl  i  t t ti  
of ideology, as well as economic problems, should be settled by other thanf i l , as ll s i  r l s. s l   s ttl   t r t  
military means; they must be solved fAFF: in peaceful contest, or, as this isilit r  s; t  st  s l  [ PP: i  f l t st, r, s t is is 
understood in capitalist society—1 by competition. fAFF: Our premise hasrst  i  it list s ciety-]  titi . [ PP: r r is  has 
been and remains that peaceful coexistence of two different sociopoliticalbeen and re ains that peaceful coexistence of t o different sociopolitical 
systems—a reality of our world—is essential, and that it is essential to ensures stems-a reality of our rld-is essential, and that it is essential to ensure 
lasting peace.l These are the principles to which we adhere.lasting peace.] hese are the principles to hich e adhere. 
[POW:
 You have nownow declared piratical measures.measures, the kind that wereu have declared piratical the kind that were 
practiced in the Middle Ages when ships passing through international waters 
were attacked, and you have called this  "quarantine" around Cuba. Our a ur 
vessels will probably soon enter the zone patrolled by your Navv.l  assure youy ] I  
now are carrying the mostthat these vessels which are  headed for Cuba e e  
innocuous [AFF: peacefull cargoes. fPOW: Do you really think that all wePP: ]  [ ll we 
spend our time on is transporting so-called offensive weapons, atomic andr time on is transporting so-cal ed of ensi  weapons. atomic and 
hydrogen bombs?] Even though your military people may possibly imagine!  
that these are some special kind of weapons, I assure you that they are the most  
ordinary [APP: kind of peaceful] goods.FF:  l  
Therefore, Mr. President. let us show good sense. I assure you that the ships ,   
bound for Cuba are carrying no armaments at all. The armaments needed for t .  
the defense of Cuba are already there.  do not mean to say that there have been   I  t  t   t  t    
no shipments of armaments at all. No, there were such shipments. But nowt . .  
Cuba has already obtained the necessary weapons for defense.  lr  t i  t  r   f r f . 
[APP: I do not know whether you can understand me and believe me. Butf FF:   t  t      li  e.  
wish you would believe yourself and agree that one should not give way toI   
one's passions; that one should be master of them.l [POW: If you begin ]  
stopping vessels it would be piracy, as you yourself know. If we should start .  lf  
doing this to your ships you would be just as indignant as we and the whole  
world are now indignant. Such actions cannot be interpreted otherwise, be­rl  r   i i t.  ti  t  i t r r t  t r i , -
cause lawlessness cannot be legalized. Were thisl fAFF: Were such actionsls  l l ss ss t  l li . r  t is] [ PP: r  s  ti s] 
allowed to happen then there would be no peace; nor would there be peacefulallo ed to happen then there ould be no peace; nor ould there be peaceful 
coexistence. fPOW: Then we would be forced to put to take the necessarycoexistence. [P : Then e ould be forced to put to take the necessary 
measures of a defensive nature which would protect our interests in accordancemeasures of a defensive nature which would protect our interests in accordance 
with international law. Why do this?l What would all this lead to? fAFF: Letwith international law. hy do this?] hat would all this lead to? [AFF: Let 
us normalize relations.lus normalize relations.] 
[POW: You said once that the United States is not preparing an invasion.1  ] 
fAFF: You have declared that you sympathized with the Cuban emigrants.!l PP .] 
fPOW: But you have also declared that you will carry out plans against the[  
present government of Cuba. Nor is it any secret to anyone that the constant      
threat of armed attack and aggression has hung and continues to hang overt r t f r  tt   r ssi  s   ti s t   r 
Cuba.l It is only this that has prompted us to respond to fAFF: the request of.] It is l  t is t t s r t  s t  r s  t  [ PP: t  r st f 
the Cuban Government to extend it our aid.l [POW: strengthen the defensethe uban overn ent to extend it our aid.] [ : strengthen the defense 
capability of that countrv.lcapability of that country.] 
Let us therefore display statesmanlike wisdom. [CONCESSION: I PROPOSE: 
WE, FOR OUR PART. WILL DECLARE THAT OUR SHIPS BOUND FOR CUBA ARE NOT,   CUBA ARE NOT 
CARRYING ANY ARMAMENTS. You WILL DECLARE THAT THE UNITED STATES WILLI  . OU     
NOT INVADE CUBA WITH ITS TROOPS AND WILL NOT SUPPORT ANY OTHER FORCES     
WHICH MIGHT INTEND TO INVADE CUBA.] Then the necessity for the presence of ]  
our military specialists in Cuba will be obviated.  li t     o i t  
[poW: Mr. President, I appeal to you to weigh carefully what the aggressive.PO  t,    lly  ag r i . 
piratical actions which you have announced the United States intends to carry out     n   
in international waters would lead to. You yourself know that a sensible personl   u your kno  that a sensible person 
simply cannot agree to this, cannot recognize your right to such action. t  t   ti . 
If you have done this as the firstfirst step towards the unleashing of war-well    i  —wel  
then—evidently nothing remains for us to do but to accept this challenge of vours.len-evidently  y .] 
If you have not lost command of yourself and realize clearly what this could lead  lf    
to, then, Mr. President, you and  should not now pull on the ends of the rope in, . . t,  I   i  
which you have tied  knot of war, because the harder you and  pull, the tighteri    ti  a t  r.  t  r r   II ll, t  ti t r 
this knot will become. And  time may come when this knot is tied so tight that thet is t ill .  a ti     t is t is ti  s  ti t t t t  
person who tied it is no longer capable of untying it fPOW: and then the knot willperson ho tied it is no longer capable of untying it [po : and then the knot ill 
have to be cut. What that would mean  need not explain to you, because youhave to be cut. hat that ould ean II need not explain to you, because you 
yourself understand perfectly what dread forces our two countries possess.lyourself understand perfectly what dread forces our two countries possess.] 
fAFF: These thoughts are governed by  sincere desire to alleviate the situation[ PP     aa si i  to al eviate the situation 
and remove the threat of war.] .l 
Respectfully,tf ly. 
N. Khrushchevr  
This version of Khrushchev's letter is aNote.   ev's  1.292-word abridgement., abridge , 
slightly modified, from the longer original text of the "informal" translation i i ,    l  e l" tra l  
published in U.S. Department of State (1973). Sentences containing power and
  rt ent  s i  r  
affiliation motive images. here bracketed. underlined, and identified by theli tion  , t , ,  tified  t  
labels POW or AFF, were included in the respective motive imagery condi-
      ti   r  ­
tions. The sentences containing Khrushchev's explicit concession, here brack- s i i  ev's i it i , r ­
eted, printed in small capitals, and identified with the label CONCESSION,.    .  tified   CON I . 
were removed in the "no concession" conditions.     i " co iti . 
